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@@ -1479,8 +1479,8 @@ an attacker who learns a node's identity key can replace that node
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indefinitely by sending new forged descriptors to the directory servers.
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\emph{Iterated compromise.} A roving adversary who can
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-compromise ORs (by system intrusion, legal coersion, or extralegal
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-coersion) could march down the circuit compromising the
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+compromise ORs (by system intrusion, legal coercion, or extralegal
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+coercion) could march down the circuit compromising the
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nodes until he reaches the end. Unless the adversary can complete
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this attack within the lifetime of the circuit, however, the ORs
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will have discarded the necessary information before the attack can
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@@ -1528,7 +1528,7 @@ anonymity of the endpoints of a circuit by its observations, a
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hostile node must be immediately adjacent to that endpoint.
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If an adversary is able to
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run multiple ORs, and is able to persuade the directory servers
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-that those ORs are trustworthy and independant, then occasionally
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+that those ORs are trustworthy and independent, then occasionally
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some user will choose one of those ORs for the start and another
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as the end of a circuit. When this happens, the user's
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anonymity is compromised for those streams. If an adversary can
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@@ -1572,7 +1572,7 @@ will result in a different negotiated session key, and so the rest
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of the recorded session can't be used.
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\emph{Smear attacks.} An attacker could use the Tor network to
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-engage in socially dissapproved acts, so as to try to bring the
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+engage in socially disapproved acts, so as to try to bring the
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entire network into disrepute and get its operators to shut it down.
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Exit policies can help reduce the possibilities for abuse, but
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ultimately, the network will require volunteers who can tolerate
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Nick Mathewson