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@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@
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#include "main.h"
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#include "networkstatus.h"
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#include "nodelist.h"
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+#include "policies.h"
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#include "rendclient.h"
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#include "rendcommon.h"
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#include "rendservice.h"
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@@ -949,6 +950,208 @@ rend_service_update_descriptor(rend_service_t *service)
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}
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}
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+static const char *sos_poison_fname = "non_anonymous_hidden_service";
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+
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+/* Allocate and return a string containing the path to the single onion
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+ * poison file in service.
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+ * The caller must free this path.
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+ * Returns NULL if there is no directory for service. */
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+static char *
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+sos_poison_path(const rend_service_t *service)
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+{
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+ char *poison_path;
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+
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+ tor_assert(service->directory);
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+
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+ tor_asprintf(&poison_path, "%s%s%s",
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+ service->directory, PATH_SEPARATOR, sos_poison_fname);
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+
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+ return poison_path;
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+}
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+
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+/** Return True if hidden services <b>service> has been poisoned by single
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+ * onion mode. */
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+static int
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+service_is_single_onion_poisoned(const rend_service_t *service)
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+{
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+ char *poison_fname = NULL;
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+ file_status_t fstatus;
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+
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+ if (!service->directory) {
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+ return 0;
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+ }
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+
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+ poison_fname = sos_poison_path(service);
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+ tor_assert(poison_fname);
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+
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+ fstatus = file_status(poison_fname);
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+ tor_free(poison_fname);
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+
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+ /* If this fname is occupied, the hidden service has been poisoned. */
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+ if (fstatus == FN_FILE || fstatus == FN_EMPTY) {
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+ return 1;
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+ }
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+
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+ return 0;
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+}
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+
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+/* Return 1 if the private key file for service exists and has a non-zero size,
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+ * and 0 otherwise. */
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+static int
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+rend_service_private_key_exists(const rend_service_t *service)
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+{
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+ char *private_key_path = rend_service_path(service, private_key_fname);
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+ const file_status_t private_key_status = file_status(private_key_path);
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+ tor_free(private_key_path);
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+ /* Only non-empty regular private key files could have been used before. */
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+ return private_key_status == FN_FILE;
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+}
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+
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+/** Check the single onion service poison state of all existing hidden service
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+ * directories:
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+ * - If each service is poisoned, and we are in OnionServiceSingleHopMode,
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+ * return 0,
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+ * - If each service is not poisoned, and we are not in
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+ * OnionServiceSingleHopMode, return 0,
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+ * - Otherwise, the poison state is invalid, and a service that was created in
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+ * one mode is being used in the other, return -1.
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+ * Hidden service directories without keys are not checked for consistency.
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+ * When their keys are created, they will be poisoned (if needed).
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+ * If a <b>service_list</b> is provided, treat it
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+ * as the list of hidden services (used in unittests). */
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+int
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+rend_service_list_verify_single_onion_poison(const smartlist_t *service_list,
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+ const or_options_t *options)
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+{
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+ const smartlist_t *s_list;
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+ /* If no special service list is provided, then just use the global one. */
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+ if (!service_list) {
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+ if (!rend_service_list) { /* No global HS list. Nothing to see here. */
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+ return 0;
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+ }
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+
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+ s_list = rend_service_list;
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+ } else {
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+ s_list = service_list;
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+ }
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+
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+ int consistent = 1;
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+ SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(s_list, const rend_service_t *, s) {
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+ if (service_is_single_onion_poisoned(s) !=
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+ rend_service_allow_non_anonymous_connection(options) &&
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+ rend_service_private_key_exists(s)) {
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+ consistent = 0;
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+ }
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+ } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(s);
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+
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+ return consistent ? 0 : -1;
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+}
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+
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+/*** Helper for rend_service_poison_new_single_onion_dirs(). When in single
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+ * onion mode, add a file to this hidden service directory that marks it as a
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+ * single onion hidden service. Returns 0 when a directory is successfully
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+ * poisoned, or if it is already poisoned. Returns -1 on a failure to read
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+ * the directory or write the poison file, or if there is an existing private
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+ * key file in the directory. (The service should have been poisoned when the
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+ * key was created.) */
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+static int
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+poison_new_single_onion_hidden_service_dir(const rend_service_t *service)
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+{
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+ /* We must only poison directories if we're in Single Onion mode */
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+ tor_assert(rend_service_allow_non_anonymous_connection(get_options()));
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+
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+ int fd;
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+ int retval = -1;
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+ char *poison_fname = NULL;
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+
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+ if (!service->directory) {
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+ log_info(LD_REND, "Ephemeral HS started in OnionServiceSingleHopMode.");
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+ return 0;
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+ }
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+
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+ /* Make sure we're only poisoning new hidden service directories */
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+ if (rend_service_private_key_exists(service)) {
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+ log_warn(LD_BUG, "Tried to single onion poison a service directory after "
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+ "the private key was created.");
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+ return -1;
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+ }
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+
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+ poison_fname = sos_poison_path(service);
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+
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+ switch (file_status(poison_fname)) {
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+ case FN_DIR:
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+ case FN_ERROR:
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+ log_warn(LD_FS, "Can't read single onion poison file \"%s\"",
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+ poison_fname);
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+ goto done;
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+ case FN_FILE: /* single onion poison file already exists. NOP. */
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+ case FN_EMPTY: /* single onion poison file already exists. NOP. */
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+ log_debug(LD_FS, "Tried to re-poison a single onion poisoned file \"%s\"",
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+ poison_fname);
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+ break;
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+ case FN_NOENT:
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+ fd = tor_open_cloexec(poison_fname, O_RDWR|O_CREAT|O_TRUNC, 0600);
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+ if (fd < 0) {
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+ log_warn(LD_FS, "Could not create single onion poison file %s",
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+ poison_fname);
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+ goto done;
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+ }
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+ close(fd);
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+ break;
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+ default:
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+ tor_assert(0);
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+ }
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+
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+ retval = 0;
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+
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+ done:
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+ tor_free(poison_fname);
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+
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+ return retval;
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+}
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+
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+/** We just got launched in OnionServiceSingleHopMode. That's a non-anoymous
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+ * mode for hidden services; hence we should mark all new hidden service
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+ * directories appropriately so that they are never launched as
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+ * location-private hidden services again. (New directories don't have private
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+ * key files.)
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+ * If a <b>service_list</b> is provided, treat it as the list of hidden
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+ * services (used in unittests).
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+ * Return 0 on success, -1 on fail. */
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+int
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+rend_service_poison_new_single_onion_dirs(const smartlist_t *service_list)
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+{
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+ /* We must only poison directories if we're in Single Onion mode */
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+ tor_assert(rend_service_allow_non_anonymous_connection(get_options()));
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+
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+ const smartlist_t *s_list;
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+ /* If no special service list is provided, then just use the global one. */
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+ if (!service_list) {
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+ if (!rend_service_list) { /* No global HS list. Nothing to see here. */
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+ return 0;
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+ }
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+
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+ s_list = rend_service_list;
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+ } else {
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+ s_list = service_list;
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+ }
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+
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+ SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(s_list, const rend_service_t *, s) {
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+ if (!rend_service_private_key_exists(s)) {
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+ if (poison_new_single_onion_hidden_service_dir(s) < 0) {
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+ return -1;
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+ }
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+ }
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+ } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(s);
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+
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+ /* The keys for these services are linked to the server IP address */
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+ log_notice(LD_REND, "The configured onion service directories have been "
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+ "used in single onion mode. They can not be used for anonymous "
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+ "hidden services.");
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+
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+ return 0;
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+}
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+
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/** Load and/or generate private keys for all hidden services, possibly
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* including keys for client authorization. Return 0 on success, -1 on
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* failure. */
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@@ -1372,6 +1575,19 @@ rend_check_authorization(rend_service_t *service,
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return 1;
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}
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+/* Can this service make a direct connection to ei?
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+ * It must be a single onion service, and the firewall rules must allow ei. */
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+static int
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+rend_service_use_direct_connection(const or_options_t* options,
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+ const extend_info_t* ei)
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+{
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+ /* The prefer_ipv6 argument to fascist_firewall_allows_address_addr is
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+ * ignored, because pref_only is 0. */
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+ return (rend_service_allow_direct_connection(options) &&
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+ fascist_firewall_allows_address_addr(&ei->addr, ei->port,
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+ FIREWALL_OR_CONNECTION, 0, 0));
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+}
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+
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/******
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* Handle cells
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******/
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@@ -1421,9 +1637,7 @@ rend_service_receive_introduction(origin_circuit_t *circuit,
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goto err;
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}
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-#ifndef NON_ANONYMOUS_MODE_ENABLED
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- tor_assert(!(circuit->build_state->onehop_tunnel));
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-#endif
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+ assert_circ_anonymity_ok(circuit, options);
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tor_assert(circuit->rend_data);
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/* We'll use this in a bazillion log messages */
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@@ -1627,6 +1841,11 @@ rend_service_receive_introduction(origin_circuit_t *circuit,
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for (i=0;i<MAX_REND_FAILURES;i++) {
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int flags = CIRCLAUNCH_NEED_CAPACITY | CIRCLAUNCH_IS_INTERNAL;
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if (circ_needs_uptime) flags |= CIRCLAUNCH_NEED_UPTIME;
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+ /* A Single Onion Service only uses a direct connection if its
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+ * firewall rules permit direct connections to the address. */
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+ if (rend_service_use_direct_connection(options, rp)) {
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+ flags = flags | CIRCLAUNCH_ONEHOP_TUNNEL;
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+ }
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launched = circuit_launch_by_extend_info(
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CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_CONNECT_REND, rp, flags);
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@@ -1739,7 +1958,10 @@ find_rp_for_intro(const rend_intro_cell_t *intro,
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goto err;
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}
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- rp = extend_info_from_node(node, 0);
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+ /* Are we in single onion mode? */
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+ const int allow_direct = rend_service_allow_non_anonymous_connection(
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+ get_options());
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+ rp = extend_info_from_node(node, allow_direct);
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if (!rp) {
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if (err_msg_out) {
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tor_asprintf(&err_msg,
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@@ -1764,6 +1986,10 @@ find_rp_for_intro(const rend_intro_cell_t *intro,
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goto err;
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}
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+ /* rp is always set here: extend_info_dup guarantees a non-NULL result, and
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+ * the other cases goto err. */
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+ tor_assert(rp);
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+
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/* Make sure the RP we are being asked to connect to is _not_ a private
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* address unless it's allowed. Let's avoid to build a circuit to our
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* second middle node and fail right after when extending to the RP. */
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@@ -2538,6 +2764,10 @@ rend_service_relaunch_rendezvous(origin_circuit_t *oldcirc)
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log_info(LD_REND,"Reattempting rendezvous circuit to '%s'",
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safe_str(extend_info_describe(oldstate->chosen_exit)));
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+ /* You'd think Single Onion Services would want to retry the rendezvous
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+ * using a direct connection. But if it's blocked by a firewall, or the
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+ * service is IPv6-only, or the rend point avoiding becoming a one-hop
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+ * proxy, we need a 3-hop connection. */
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newcirc = circuit_launch_by_extend_info(CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_CONNECT_REND,
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oldstate->chosen_exit,
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CIRCLAUNCH_NEED_CAPACITY|CIRCLAUNCH_IS_INTERNAL);
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@@ -2566,6 +2796,11 @@ rend_service_launch_establish_intro(rend_service_t *service,
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rend_intro_point_t *intro)
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{
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origin_circuit_t *launched;
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+ int flags = CIRCLAUNCH_NEED_UPTIME|CIRCLAUNCH_IS_INTERNAL;
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+
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+ if (rend_service_allow_direct_connection(get_options())) {
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+ flags = flags | CIRCLAUNCH_ONEHOP_TUNNEL;
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+ }
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log_info(LD_REND,
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"Launching circuit to introduction point %s for service %s",
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@@ -2576,8 +2811,7 @@ rend_service_launch_establish_intro(rend_service_t *service,
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++service->n_intro_circuits_launched;
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launched = circuit_launch_by_extend_info(CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_ESTABLISH_INTRO,
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- intro->extend_info,
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- CIRCLAUNCH_NEED_UPTIME|CIRCLAUNCH_IS_INTERNAL);
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+ intro->extend_info, flags);
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if (!launched) {
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log_info(LD_REND,
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@@ -2651,9 +2885,7 @@ rend_service_intro_has_opened(origin_circuit_t *circuit)
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int reason = END_CIRC_REASON_TORPROTOCOL;
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tor_assert(circuit->base_.purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_ESTABLISH_INTRO);
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-#ifndef NON_ANONYMOUS_MODE_ENABLED
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- tor_assert(!(circuit->build_state->onehop_tunnel));
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-#endif
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+ assert_circ_anonymity_ok(circuit, get_options());
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tor_assert(circuit->cpath);
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tor_assert(circuit->rend_data);
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@@ -2720,6 +2952,7 @@ rend_service_intro_has_opened(origin_circuit_t *circuit)
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log_info(LD_REND,
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"Established circuit %u as introduction point for service %s",
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(unsigned)circuit->base_.n_circ_id, serviceid);
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+ circuit_log_path(LOG_INFO, LD_REND, circuit);
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/* Use the intro key instead of the service key in ESTABLISH_INTRO. */
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crypto_pk_t *intro_key = circuit->intro_key;
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@@ -2849,9 +3082,7 @@ rend_service_rendezvous_has_opened(origin_circuit_t *circuit)
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tor_assert(circuit->base_.purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_CONNECT_REND);
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tor_assert(circuit->cpath);
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tor_assert(circuit->build_state);
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-#ifndef NON_ANONYMOUS_MODE_ENABLED
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- tor_assert(!(circuit->build_state->onehop_tunnel));
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-#endif
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+ assert_circ_anonymity_ok(circuit, get_options());
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tor_assert(circuit->rend_data);
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/* Declare the circuit dirty to avoid reuse, and for path-bias */
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@@ -2871,6 +3102,7 @@ rend_service_rendezvous_has_opened(origin_circuit_t *circuit)
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"Done building circuit %u to rendezvous with "
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"cookie %s for service %s",
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(unsigned)circuit->base_.n_circ_id, hexcookie, serviceid);
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+ circuit_log_path(LOG_INFO, LD_REND, circuit);
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/* Clear the 'in-progress HS circ has timed out' flag for
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* consistency with what happens on the client side; this line has
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@@ -3547,7 +3779,8 @@ rend_consider_services_intro_points(void)
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* pick it again in the next iteration. */
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smartlist_add(exclude_nodes, (void*)node);
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intro = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(rend_intro_point_t));
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- intro->extend_info = extend_info_from_node(node, 0);
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+ intro->extend_info = extend_info_from_node(node,
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+ rend_service_allow_direct_connection(options));
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intro->intro_key = crypto_pk_new();
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const int fail = crypto_pk_generate_key(intro->intro_key);
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tor_assert(!fail);
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@@ -3592,8 +3825,9 @@ rend_consider_services_upload(time_t now)
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{
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int i;
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rend_service_t *service;
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- int rendpostperiod = get_options()->RendPostPeriod;
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- int rendinitialpostdelay = (get_options()->TestingTorNetwork ?
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+ const or_options_t *options = get_options();
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+ int rendpostperiod = options->RendPostPeriod;
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+ int rendinitialpostdelay = (options->TestingTorNetwork ?
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MIN_REND_INITIAL_POST_DELAY_TESTING :
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MIN_REND_INITIAL_POST_DELAY);
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@@ -3604,6 +3838,12 @@ rend_consider_services_upload(time_t now)
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* the descriptor is stable before being published. See comment below. */
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service->next_upload_time =
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now + rendinitialpostdelay + crypto_rand_int(2*rendpostperiod);
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+ /* Single Onion Services prioritise availability over hiding their
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+ * startup time, as their IP address is publicly discoverable anyway.
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+ */
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+ if (rend_service_reveal_startup_time(options)) {
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+ service->next_upload_time = now + rendinitialpostdelay;
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+ }
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}
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/* Does every introduction points have been established? */
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unsigned int intro_points_ready =
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@@ -3844,11 +4084,30 @@ rend_service_set_connection_addr_port(edge_connection_t *conn,
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return -2;
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}
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-/* Stub that should be replaced with the #17178 version of the function
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- * when merging. */
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+/* Do the options allow onion services to make direct (non-anonymous)
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+ * connections to introduction or rendezvous points?
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+ * Returns true if tor is in OnionServiceSingleHopMode. */
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int
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-rend_service_allow_direct_connection(const or_options_t *options)
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+rend_service_allow_non_anonymous_connection(const or_options_t *options)
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{
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- (void)options;
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- return 0;
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+ return options->OnionServiceSingleHopMode ? 1 : 0;
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+}
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+
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+/* Do the options allow us to reveal the exact startup time of the onion
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+ * service?
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+ * Single Onion Services prioritise availability over hiding their
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+ * startup time, as their IP address is publicly discoverable anyway.
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+ * Returns true if tor is in OnionServiceSingleHopMode. */
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+int
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+rend_service_reveal_startup_time(const or_options_t *options)
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+{
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+ return rend_service_allow_non_anonymous_connection(options);
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+}
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+
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+/* Is non-anonymous mode enabled using the OnionServiceNonAnonymousMode
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+ * config option? */
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+int
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+rend_service_non_anonymous_mode_enabled(const or_options_t *options)
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+{
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+ return options->OnionServiceNonAnonymousMode ? 1 : 0;
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}
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teor (Tim Wilson-Brown)