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@@ -55,6 +55,13 @@ IP-based.
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approach would also resolve the "Make sure you can't construct a
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distinct address to match an existing one" note below. -RD]
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+ [I think, if we get a replay, we need to sen back the same
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+ answer as we did the first time, not say "try again."
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+ Otherwise we need to worry that an attacker can keep people
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+ from getting bridges by preemtively asking for them,
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+ or that an attacker may force them to prove they haven't
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+ gotten any bridges by asking. -NM]
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+
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[While we're at it, if we do the replay cache thing and don't need
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repeatable answers, we could just pick K random answers from the
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pool. Is it beneficial that a bridge user who knows about a clump of
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@@ -68,12 +75,20 @@ IP-based.
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the difference in clumps and estimate how quickly the bridge pool
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is growing. -RD]
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+ [Random is one more darn thing to implement; rings are already
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+ there. -NM]
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+
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[If we make the period P be mailbox-specific, and make it a random
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value around some mean, then we make it harder for an attacker to
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know when to try using his small army of gmail addresses to gather
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another harvest. But we also make it harder for users to know when
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they can try again. -RD]
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+ [Letting the users know about when they can try again seems
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+ worthwhile. Otherwise users and attackers will all probe and
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+ probe and probe until they get an answer. No additional
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+ security will be achieved, but bandwidth will be lost. -NM]
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+
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To normalize an email address:
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Start with the RFC822 address. Consider only the mailbox {???}
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portion of the address (username@domain). Put this into lowercase
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@@ -140,8 +155,9 @@ IP-based.
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in the ring after X.
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[Don't we want to compute C = HMAC(key, area) to learn what cluster
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- to answer from, and then X = HMAC(key, PS|area) to pick a point in
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- that ring? -RD]
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+ to answer from, and then X = HMAC(key, PS|area) to pick a point in
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+ that ring? -RD]
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+
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Need to clarify that some HMACs are for rings, and some are for
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partitions. How rings scale is clear. How do we grow the number of
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Nick Mathewson