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@@ -2523,15 +2523,13 @@ options_validate(or_options_t *old_options, or_options_t *options,
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}
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if (options->Tor2webMode && options->UseEntryGuards) {
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- /* Tor2WebMode is incompatible with EntryGuards in two ways:
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- *
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- * - Tor2WebMode uses its guard nodes as rend and intro points.
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- * This makes tor2web users fingerprintable by their continued
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- * selection of the same 3 nodes for these circuits (their guard
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- * nodes).
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- *
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- * - Tor2WebMode makes unexpected use of circuit path lengths
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- * in ways that prevent us from applying the PathBias defense.
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+ /* tor2web mode clients do not (and should not) use entry guards
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+ * in any meaningful way. Further, tor2web mode causes the hidden
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+ * service client code to do things which break the path bias
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+ * detector, and it's far easier to turn off entry guards (and
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+ * thus the path bias detector with it) than to figure out how to
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+ * make a piece of code which cannot possibly help tor2web mode
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+ * users compatible with tor2web mode.
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*/
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log_notice(LD_CONFIG,
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"Tor2WebMode is enabled; disabling UseEntryGuards.");
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