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@@ -3984,10 +3984,10 @@ entry_nodes_should_be_added(void)
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should_add_entry_nodes = 1;
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}
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-/** Add all nodes in EntryNodes that aren't currently guard nodes to the list
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- * of guard nodes, at the front. */
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+/** Adjust the entry guards list so that it only contains entries from
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+ * EntryNodes, adding new entries from EntryNodes to the list as needed. */
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static void
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-entry_guards_prepend_from_config(const or_options_t *options)
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+entry_guards_set_from_config(const or_options_t *options)
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{
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smartlist_t *entry_nodes, *worse_entry_nodes, *entry_fps;
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smartlist_t *old_entry_guards_on_list, *old_entry_guards_not_on_list;
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@@ -4017,12 +4017,6 @@ entry_guards_prepend_from_config(const or_options_t *options)
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/* Split entry guards into those on the list and those not. */
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- /* XXXX023 Now that we allow countries and IP ranges in EntryNodes, this is
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- * potentially an enormous list. For now, we disable such values for
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- * EntryNodes in options_validate(); really, this wants a better solution.
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- * Perhaps we should do this calculation once whenever the list of routers
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- * changes or the entrynodes setting changes.
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- */
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routerset_get_all_nodes(entry_nodes, options->EntryNodes,
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options->ExcludeNodes, 0);
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SMARTLIST_FOREACH(entry_nodes, const node_t *,node,
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@@ -4036,17 +4030,15 @@ entry_guards_prepend_from_config(const or_options_t *options)
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});
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/* Remove all currently configured guard nodes, excluded nodes, unreachable
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- * nodes, or non-Guard nodes from entry_routers. */
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+ * nodes, or non-Guard nodes from entry_nodes. */
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SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(entry_nodes, const node_t *, node) {
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if (is_an_entry_guard(node->identity)) {
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SMARTLIST_DEL_CURRENT(entry_nodes, node);
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continue;
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} else if (routerset_contains_node(options->ExcludeNodes, node)) {
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- log_notice(LD_GENERAL, "Dropping node: excluded");
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SMARTLIST_DEL_CURRENT(entry_nodes, node);
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continue;
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} else if (!fascist_firewall_allows_node(node)) {
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- log_notice(LD_GENERAL, "Dropping node: fascist firewall");
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SMARTLIST_DEL_CURRENT(entry_nodes, node);
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continue;
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} else if (! node->is_possible_guard) {
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@@ -4059,7 +4051,7 @@ entry_guards_prepend_from_config(const or_options_t *options)
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smartlist_clear(entry_guards);
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/* First, the previously configured guards that are in EntryNodes. */
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smartlist_add_all(entry_guards, old_entry_guards_on_list);
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- /* Next, scramble the reset of EntryNodes, putting the guards first. */
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+ /* Next, scramble the rest of EntryNodes, putting the guards first. */
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smartlist_shuffle(entry_nodes);
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smartlist_shuffle(worse_entry_nodes);
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smartlist_add_all(entry_nodes, worse_entry_nodes);
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@@ -4125,7 +4117,7 @@ choose_random_entry(cpath_build_state_t *state)
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entry_guards = smartlist_create();
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if (should_add_entry_nodes)
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- entry_guards_prepend_from_config(options);
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+ entry_guards_set_from_config(options);
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if (!entry_list_is_constrained(options) &&
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smartlist_len(entry_guards) < options->NumEntryGuards)
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@@ -4150,7 +4142,7 @@ choose_random_entry(cpath_build_state_t *state)
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goto choose_and_finish; /* only choose from the ones we like */
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if (options->StrictNodes) {
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/* in theory this case should never happen, since
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- * entry_guards_prepend_from_config() drops unwanted relays */
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+ * entry_guards_set_from_config() drops unwanted relays */
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tor_fragile_assert();
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} else {
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log_info(LD_CIRC,
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