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@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
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-Filename: 105-less-tls-constraint.txt
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+Filename: 106-less-tls-constraint.txt
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Title: Checking fewer things during TLS handshakes
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Version: $Revision: 12105 $
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Last-Modified: $Date: 2007-01-30T07:50:01.643717Z $
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@@ -15,8 +15,10 @@ Motivation:
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Later, we want to try harder to avoid protocol fingerprinting attacks.
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This means that we'll need to make our connection handshake look closer
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- to a regular HTTPS connection. For now, about the best we can do is to
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- stop requiring things during handshake that we don't actually use.
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+ to a regular HTTPS connection: one certificate on the server side and
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+ zero certificates on the client side. For now, about the best we
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+ can do is to stop requiring things during handshake that we don't
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+ actually use.
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What we check now, and where we check it:
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@@ -26,7 +28,7 @@ tor_tls_check_lifetime:
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tor_tls_verify:
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peer has at least one certificate
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- There is at lease one certificate in the chain
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+ There is at least one certificate in the chain
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At least one of the certificates in the chain is not the one used to
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negotiate the connection. (The "identity cert".)
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The certificate _not_ used to negotiate the connection has signed the
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@@ -56,16 +58,19 @@ USEFUL THINGS WE COULD DO:
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an identity certificate. Internally to the code, we could assign the
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identity_digest field of these or_connections to a random number, or even
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not add them to the identity_digest->or_conn map.
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+[so if somebody connects with no certs, we let them. and mark them as
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+a client and don't treat them as a server. great. -rd]
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-[2] Instead of using a restricted nickname character set that make our
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+[2] Instead of using a restricted nickname character set that makes our
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commonName structure look unlike typical SSL certificates, we could treat
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the nickname as extending from the start of the commonName up to but not
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- including the first non-nickname character
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+ including the first non-nickname character.
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Alternatively, we could stop checking commonNames entirely. We don't
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actually _do_ anything based on the nickname in the certificate, so
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there's really no harm in letting every router have any commonName it
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wants.
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+[this is the better choice -rd]
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REMAINING WAYS TO RECOGNIZE CLIENT->SERVER CONNECTIONS:
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