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@@ -66,6 +66,7 @@ N . Controller improvements
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immediately, since tor will exit right after.
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o Implement
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- Test, debug
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+ - Allow EXTENDCIRCUIT to unknown server.
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. Switch example controllers to use new protocol
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. Python
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o Implement main controller interface
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@@ -81,12 +82,13 @@ N . Controller improvements
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first place.) Also, we should audit all users of get_pending_bytes().)
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- Make it harder to circumvent bandwidth caps: look at number of bytes
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sent across sockets, not number sent inside TLS stream.
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- - Handle rendezvousing with unverified nodes.
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- - Specify: Stick rendezvous point's key in INTRODUCE cell.
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- Bob should _always_ use key from INTRODUCE cell.
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- - Change to new rendezvous introduction cell format. (It's currently #if
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- 0'd out). Unless we already did that.
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- - Implement.
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+N - Handle rendezvousing with unverified nodes.
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+ o Specify: Stick rendezvous point's address and port in INTRODUCE cell.
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+ - Handle new format.
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+ - Parse and generate new format (#if0 out the logic to generate it.)
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+ - Support to extend circuit/target circuit to a chosen combination of
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+ addr/port/ID/onionkey
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+ - Verify that new code works.
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- it looks like tor_assert writes to stderr. what happens if
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stderr was closed and is now something else? uh.
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- christian grothoff's attack of infinite-length circuit.
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