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@@ -245,6 +245,12 @@ int connection_tls_continue_handshake(connection_t *conn) {
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return 0;
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}
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+static int digest_is_nonzero(const char *id) {
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+ char ZERO_DIGEST[DIGEST_LEN];
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+ memset(ZERO_DIGEST, 0, DIGEST_LEN);
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+ return !memcmp(ZERO_DIGEST, id, DIGEST_LEN);
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+}
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+
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/** The tls handshake is finished.
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*
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* Make sure we are happy with the person we just handshaked with:
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@@ -270,6 +276,7 @@ connection_tls_finish_handshake(connection_t *conn) {
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char nickname[MAX_NICKNAME_LEN+1];
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connection_t *c;
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crypto_pk_env_t *identity_rcvd=NULL;
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+ char digest_rcvd[DIGEST_LEN];
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conn->state = OR_CONN_STATE_OPEN;
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connection_watch_events(conn, POLLIN);
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@@ -291,32 +298,24 @@ connection_tls_finish_handshake(connection_t *conn) {
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}
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log_fn(LOG_DEBUG, "Other side (%s:%d) claims to be '%s'", conn->address,
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conn->port, nickname);
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- router = router_get_by_nickname(nickname);
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- /* XXX008 here we need to tolerate unknown routers, so ORs can
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- * connect to us even when we don't know they're verified. This
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- * should probably be a call to router_get_by_digest() now, since
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- * we can't trust the nickname some guy shows up with. */
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- if (!router) {
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- log_fn(LOG_INFO, "Unrecognized router with nickname '%s' at %s:%d",
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- nickname, conn->address, conn->port);
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- return -1;
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- }
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- if(tor_tls_verify(conn->tls, &identity_rcvd)<0) {
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+
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+ if(tor_tls_verify(conn->tls, &identity_rcvd) < 0) {
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log_fn(LOG_WARN,"Other side '%s' (%s:%d) has a cert but it's invalid. Closing.",
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nickname, conn->address, conn->port);
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return -1;
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}
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log_fn(LOG_DEBUG,"The router's cert is valid.");
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- if(crypto_pk_cmp_keys(identity_rcvd, router->identity_pkey) != 0) {
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- crypto_free_pk_env(identity_rcvd);
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+ crypto_pk_get_digest(identity_rcvd, digest_rcvd);
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+ crypto_free_pk_env(identity_rcvd);
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+
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+ router = router_get_by_nickname(nickname);
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+ if(router && /* we know this nickname; make sure it's the right guy */
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+ memcmp(digest_rcvd, router->identity_digest, DIGEST_LEN) != 0) {
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log_fn(LOG_WARN, "Identity key not as expected for %s", nickname);
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return -1;
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}
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- crypto_free_pk_env(identity_rcvd);
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- /* XXXX008 This isn't right; fix this one we launch by identity digest
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- * XXXX008 rather than by nickname */
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- if (conn->nickname) {
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+ if (digest_is_nonzero(conn->identity_digest)) {
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/* I initiated this connection. */
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if (strcasecmp(conn->nickname, nickname)) {
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log_fn(options.DirPort ? LOG_WARN : LOG_INFO,
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@@ -325,11 +324,11 @@ connection_tls_finish_handshake(connection_t *conn) {
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return -1;
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}
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} else {
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- if((c=connection_get_by_identity_digest(router->identity_digest, CONN_TYPE_OR))) {
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- log_fn(LOG_INFO,"Router %s is already connected on fd %d. Dropping fd %d.", router->nickname, c->s, conn->s);
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+ if((c=connection_get_by_identity_digest(digest_rcvd, CONN_TYPE_OR))) {
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+ log_fn(LOG_INFO,"Router %s is already connected on fd %d. Dropping fd %d.", nickname, c->s, conn->s);
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return -1;
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}
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- connection_or_init_conn_from_router(conn,router);
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+ connection_or_init_conn_from_address(conn,conn->addr,conn->port,digest_rcvd);
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}
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if (!server_mode()) { /* If I'm an OP... */
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