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Merge remote-tracking branch 'yawning/bug16052a_027'

Nick Mathewson 9 years ago
parent
commit
eb7f4d0059
9 changed files with 141 additions and 10 deletions
  1. 5 0
      changes/feature16052
  2. 10 0
      doc/tor.1.txt
  3. 19 8
      src/or/circuituse.c
  4. 2 0
      src/or/config.c
  5. 2 0
      src/or/connection_edge.c
  6. 20 1
      src/or/control.c
  7. 3 0
      src/or/or.h
  8. 78 1
      src/or/rendservice.c
  9. 2 0
      src/or/rendservice.h

+ 5 - 0
changes/feature16052

@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+  o Minor features (hidden service):
+    - Add the new options "HiddenServiceMaxStreams" and
+      "HiddenServiceMaxStreamsCloseCircuit" to allow hidden services to limit
+      the maximum number of simultaneous streams per circuit, and optionally
+      tear down the circuit when the limit is exceeded. Part of ticket 16052.

+ 10 - 0
doc/tor.1.txt

@@ -2149,6 +2149,16 @@ The following options are used to configure a hidden service.
    not an authorization mechanism; it is instead meant to be a mild
    inconvenience to port-scanners.) (Default: 0)
 
+[[HiddenServiceMaxStreams]] **HiddenServiceMaxStreams** __N__::
+   The maximum number of simultaneous streams (connections) per rendezvous
+   circuit. (Setting this to 0 will allow an unlimited number of simultanous
+   streams.) (Default: 0)
+
+[[HiddenServiceMaxStreamsCloseCircuit]] **HiddenServiceMaxStreamsCloseCircuit** **0**|**1**::
+   If set to 1, then exceeding **HiddenServiceMaxStreams** will cause the
+   offending rendezvous circuit to be torn down, as opposed to stream creation
+   requests that exceed the limit being silently ignored. (Default: 0)
+
 [[RendPostPeriod]] **RendPostPeriod** __N__ **seconds**|**minutes**|**hours**|**days**|**weeks**::
     Every time the specified period elapses, Tor uploads any rendezvous
     service descriptors to the directory servers. This information  is also

+ 19 - 8
src/or/circuituse.c

@@ -1189,17 +1189,28 @@ circuit_detach_stream(circuit_t *circ, edge_connection_t *conn)
 
   if (CIRCUIT_IS_ORIGIN(circ)) {
     origin_circuit_t *origin_circ = TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(circ);
+    int removed = 0;
     if (conn == origin_circ->p_streams) {
       origin_circ->p_streams = conn->next_stream;
-      return;
+      removed = 1;
+    } else {
+      for (prevconn = origin_circ->p_streams;
+           prevconn && prevconn->next_stream && prevconn->next_stream != conn;
+           prevconn = prevconn->next_stream)
+        ;
+      if (prevconn && prevconn->next_stream) {
+        prevconn->next_stream = conn->next_stream;
+        removed = 1;
+      }
     }
-
-    for (prevconn = origin_circ->p_streams;
-         prevconn && prevconn->next_stream && prevconn->next_stream != conn;
-         prevconn = prevconn->next_stream)
-      ;
-    if (prevconn && prevconn->next_stream) {
-      prevconn->next_stream = conn->next_stream;
+    if (removed) {
+      /* If the stream was removed, and it was a rend stream, decrement the
+       * number of streams on the circuit associated with the rend service.
+       */
+      if (circ->purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_REND_JOINED) {
+        tor_assert(origin_circ->rend_data);
+        origin_circ->rend_data->nr_streams--;
+      }
       return;
     }
   } else {

+ 2 - 0
src/or/config.c

@@ -286,6 +286,8 @@ static config_var_t option_vars_[] = {
   VAR("HiddenServiceVersion",LINELIST_S, RendConfigLines,    NULL),
   VAR("HiddenServiceAuthorizeClient",LINELIST_S,RendConfigLines, NULL),
   VAR("HiddenServiceAllowUnknownPorts",LINELIST_S, RendConfigLines, NULL),
+  VAR("HiddenServiceMaxStreams",LINELIST_S, RendConfigLines, NULL),
+  VAR("HiddenServiceMaxStreamsCloseCircuit",LINELIST_S, RendConfigLines, NULL),
   V(HiddenServiceStatistics,     BOOL,     "0"),
   V(HidServAuth,                 LINELIST, NULL),
   V(CloseHSClientCircuitsImmediatelyOnTimeout, BOOL, "0"),

+ 2 - 0
src/or/connection_edge.c

@@ -2860,6 +2860,8 @@ connection_exit_begin_conn(cell_t *cell, circuit_t *circ)
     origin_circ->p_streams = n_stream;
     assert_circuit_ok(circ);
 
+    origin_circ->rend_data->nr_streams++;
+
     connection_exit_connect(n_stream);
 
     /* For path bias: This circuit was used successfully */

+ 20 - 1
src/or/control.c

@@ -3566,9 +3566,12 @@ handle_control_add_onion(control_connection_t *conn,
   smartlist_t *port_cfgs = smartlist_new();
   int discard_pk = 0;
   int detach = 0;
+  int max_streams = 0;
+  int max_streams_close_circuit = 0;
   for (size_t i = 1; i < arg_len; i++) {
     static const char *port_prefix = "Port=";
     static const char *flags_prefix = "Flags=";
+    static const char *max_s_prefix = "MaxStreams=";
 
     const char *arg = smartlist_get(args, i);
     if (!strcasecmpstart(arg, port_prefix)) {
@@ -3582,15 +3585,27 @@ handle_control_add_onion(control_connection_t *conn,
         goto out;
       }
       smartlist_add(port_cfgs, cfg);
+    } else if (!strcasecmpstart(arg, max_s_prefix)) {
+      /* "MaxStreams=[0..65535]". */
+      const char *max_s_str = arg + strlen(max_s_prefix);
+      int ok = 0;
+      max_streams = (int)tor_parse_long(max_s_str, 10, 0, 65535, &ok, NULL);
+      if (!ok) {
+        connection_printf_to_buf(conn, "512 Invalid MaxStreams\r\n");
+        goto out;
+      }
     } else if (!strcasecmpstart(arg, flags_prefix)) {
       /* "Flags=Flag[,Flag]", where Flag can be:
        *   * 'DiscardPK' - If tor generates the keypair, do not include it in
        *                   the response.
        *   * 'Detach' - Do not tie this onion service to any particular control
        *                connection.
+       *   * 'MaxStreamsCloseCircuit' - Close the circuit if MaxStreams is
+       *                                exceeded.
        */
       static const char *discard_flag = "DiscardPK";
       static const char *detach_flag = "Detach";
+      static const char *max_s_close_flag = "MaxStreamsCloseCircuit";
 
       smartlist_t *flags = smartlist_new();
       int bad = 0;
@@ -3607,6 +3622,8 @@ handle_control_add_onion(control_connection_t *conn,
           discard_pk = 1;
         } else if (!strcasecmp(flag, detach_flag)) {
           detach = 1;
+        } else if (!strcasecmp(flag, max_s_close_flag)) {
+          max_streams_close_circuit = 1;
         } else {
           connection_printf_to_buf(conn,
                                    "512 Invalid 'Flags' argument: %s\r\n",
@@ -3652,7 +3669,9 @@ handle_control_add_onion(control_connection_t *conn,
    * regardless of success/failure.
    */
   char *service_id = NULL;
-  int ret = rend_service_add_ephemeral(pk, port_cfgs, &service_id);
+  int ret = rend_service_add_ephemeral(pk, port_cfgs, max_streams,
+                                       max_streams_close_circuit,
+                                       &service_id);
   port_cfgs = NULL; /* port_cfgs is now owned by the rendservice code. */
   switch (ret) {
   case RSAE_OKAY:

+ 3 - 0
src/or/or.h

@@ -818,6 +818,9 @@ typedef struct rend_data_t {
   /** List of HSDir fingerprints on which this request has been sent to.
    * This contains binary identity digest of the directory. */
   smartlist_t *hsdirs_fp;
+
+  /** Number of streams associated with this rendezvous circuit. */
+  int nr_streams;
 } rend_data_t;
 
 /** Time interval for tracking replays of DH public keys received in

+ 78 - 1
src/or/rendservice.c

@@ -147,6 +147,13 @@ typedef struct rend_service_t {
   /** If true, we don't close circuits for making requests to unsupported
    * ports. */
   int allow_unknown_ports;
+  /** The maximum number of simultanious streams-per-circuit that are allowed
+   * to be established, or 0 if no limit is set.
+   */
+  int max_streams_per_circuit;
+  /** If true, we close circuits that exceed the max_streams_per_circuit
+   * limit.  */
+  int max_streams_close_circuit;
 } rend_service_t;
 
 /** Returns a escaped string representation of the service, <b>s</b>.
@@ -259,6 +266,23 @@ rend_add_service(rend_service_t *service)
 
   service->intro_nodes = smartlist_new();
 
+  if (service->max_streams_per_circuit < 0) {
+    log_warn(LD_CONFIG, "Hidden service (%s) configured with negative max "
+                        "streams per circuit; ignoring.",
+             rend_service_escaped_dir(service));
+    rend_service_free(service);
+    return -1;
+  }
+
+  if (service->max_streams_close_circuit < 0 ||
+      service->max_streams_close_circuit > 1) {
+    log_warn(LD_CONFIG, "Hidden service (%s) configured with invalid "
+                        "max streams handling; ignoring.",
+             rend_service_escaped_dir(service));
+    rend_service_free(service);
+    return -1;
+  }
+
   if (service->auth_type != REND_NO_AUTH &&
       smartlist_len(service->clients) == 0) {
     log_warn(LD_CONFIG, "Hidden service (%s) with client authorization but no "
@@ -539,6 +563,33 @@ rend_config_services(const or_options_t *options, int validate_only)
         log_info(LD_CONFIG,
                  "HiddenServiceDirGroupReadable=%d for %s",
                  service->dir_group_readable, service->directory);
+    } else if (!strcasecmp(line->key, "HiddenServiceMaxStreams")) {
+      service->max_streams_per_circuit = (int)tor_parse_long(line->value,
+                                                    10, 0, 65535, &ok, NULL);
+      if (!ok) {
+        log_warn(LD_CONFIG,
+                 "HiddenServiceMaxStreams should be between 0 and %d, not %s",
+                 65535, line->value);
+        rend_service_free(service);
+        return -1;
+      }
+      log_info(LD_CONFIG,
+               "HiddenServiceMaxStreams=%d for %s",
+               service->max_streams_per_circuit, service->directory);
+    } else if (!strcasecmp(line->key, "HiddenServiceMaxStreamsCloseCircuit")) {
+      service->max_streams_close_circuit = (int)tor_parse_long(line->value,
+                                                        10, 0, 1, &ok, NULL);
+      if (!ok) {
+        log_warn(LD_CONFIG,
+                 "HiddenServiceMaxStreamsCloseCircuit should be 0 or 1, not %s",
+                 line->value);
+        rend_service_free(service);
+        return -1;
+      }
+      log_info(LD_CONFIG,
+               "HiddenServiceMaxStreamsCloseCircuit=%d for %s",
+               (int)service->max_streams_close_circuit, service->directory);
+
     } else if (!strcasecmp(line->key, "HiddenServiceAuthorizeClient")) {
       /* Parse auth type and comma-separated list of client names and add a
        * rend_authorized_client_t for each client to the service's list
@@ -758,7 +809,10 @@ rend_config_services(const or_options_t *options, int validate_only)
   return 0;
 }
 
-/** Add the ephemeral service <b>pk</b>/<b>ports</b> if possible.
+/** Add the ephemeral service <b>pk</b>/<b>ports</b> if possible, with
+ * <b>max_streams_per_circuit</b> streams allowed per rendezvous circuit,
+ * and circuit closure on max streams being exceeded set by
+ * <b>max_streams_close_circuit</b>.
  *
  * Regardless of sucess/failure, callers should not touch pk/ports after
  * calling this routine, and may assume that correct cleanup has been done
@@ -769,6 +823,8 @@ rend_config_services(const or_options_t *options, int validate_only)
 rend_service_add_ephemeral_status_t
 rend_service_add_ephemeral(crypto_pk_t *pk,
                            smartlist_t *ports,
+                           int max_streams_per_circuit,
+                           int max_streams_close_circuit,
                            char **service_id_out)
 {
   *service_id_out = NULL;
@@ -782,6 +838,8 @@ rend_service_add_ephemeral(crypto_pk_t *pk,
   s->ports = ports;
   s->intro_period_started = time(NULL);
   s->n_intro_points_wanted = NUM_INTRO_POINTS_DEFAULT;
+  s->max_streams_per_circuit = max_streams_per_circuit;
+  s->max_streams_close_circuit = max_streams_close_circuit;
   if (rend_service_derive_key_digests(s) < 0) {
     rend_service_free(s);
     return RSAE_BADPRIVKEY;
@@ -3795,6 +3853,25 @@ rend_service_set_connection_addr_port(edge_connection_t *conn,
              serviceid, (unsigned)circ->base_.n_circ_id);
     return -2;
   }
+  if (service->max_streams_per_circuit > 0) {
+    /* Enforce the streams-per-circuit limit, and refuse to provide a
+     * mapping if this circuit will exceed the limit. */
+#define MAX_STREAM_WARN_INTERVAL 600
+    static struct ratelim_t stream_ratelim =
+        RATELIM_INIT(MAX_STREAM_WARN_INTERVAL);
+    if (circ->rend_data->nr_streams >= service->max_streams_per_circuit) {
+      log_fn_ratelim(&stream_ratelim, LOG_WARN, LD_REND,
+                     "Maximum streams per circuit limit reached on rendezvous "
+                     "circuit %u; %s.  Circuit has %d out of %d streams.",
+                     (unsigned)circ->base_.n_circ_id,
+                     service->max_streams_close_circuit ?
+                       "closing circuit" :
+                       "ignoring open stream request",
+                     circ->rend_data->nr_streams,
+                     service->max_streams_per_circuit);
+      return service->max_streams_close_circuit ? -2 : -1;
+    }
+  }
   matching_ports = smartlist_new();
   SMARTLIST_FOREACH(service->ports, rend_service_port_config_t *, p,
   {

+ 2 - 0
src/or/rendservice.h

@@ -117,6 +117,8 @@ typedef enum {
 } rend_service_add_ephemeral_status_t;
 rend_service_add_ephemeral_status_t rend_service_add_ephemeral(crypto_pk_t *pk,
                                smartlist_t *ports,
+                               int max_streams_per_circuit,
+                               int max_streams_close_circuit,
                                char **service_id_out);
 int rend_service_del_ephemeral(const char *service_id);