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Add initial interfaces and code for TLS support. Interfaces are right; code needs work and testing.

svn:r424
Nick Mathewson 21 years ago
parent
commit
fd20011c26
9 changed files with 425 additions and 162 deletions
  1. 2 2
      configure.in
  2. 23 151
      doc/tor-spec.txt
  3. 2 2
      src/common/Makefile.am
  4. 1 5
      src/common/crypto.c
  5. 5 1
      src/common/crypto.h
  6. 323 0
      src/common/tortls.c
  7. 29 0
      src/common/tortls.h
  8. 33 0
      src/or/buffers.c
  9. 7 1
      src/or/or.h

+ 2 - 2
configure.in

@@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ AC_CACHE_CHECK([for OpenSSL directory], ac_cv_openssldir, [
         for ssldir in $tryssldir "" /usr/local/openssl /usr/lib/openssl /usr/local/ssl /usr/lib/ssl /usr/local /usr/pkg /opt /opt/openssl ; do
                 CPPFLAGS="$saved_CPPFLAGS"
                 LDFLAGS="$saved_LDFLAGS"
-                LIBS="$saved_LIBS -lcrypto"
+                LIBS="$saved_LIBS -lcrypto -lssl"
                 
                 # Skip directories if they don't exist
                 if test ! -z "$ssldir" -a ! -d "$ssldir" ; then
@@ -126,7 +126,7 @@ if (test ! -z "$ac_cv_openssldir" && test "x$ac_cv_openssldir" != "x(system)") ;
                 fi
         fi
 fi
-LIBS="$saved_LIBS -lcrypto"
+LIBS="$saved_LIBS -lcrypto -lssl"
 
 dnl The warning message here is no longer strictly accurate.
 

+ 23 - 151
doc/tor-spec.txt

@@ -42,160 +42,32 @@ each node knows its predecessor and successor, but no others. Traffic
 flowing down the circuit is unwrapped by a symmetric key at each node,
 which reveals the downstream node.
 
-
 2. Connections
 
-2.1. Establishing connections to onion routers (ORs)
-
    There are two ways to connect to an OR. The first is as an onion
-   proxy (OP), which allows any node to connect without providing any
-   authentication or name. The second is as another OR, which allows
-   strong authentication. In both cases the initiating party (called
-   the 'client') sets up shared keys with the listening OR (called the
-   'server').
-
-   Before the handshake begins, assume all parties know the {(1024-bit)
-   public key, IPV4 address, and port} triplet of each OR.
-
-     1. Client connects to server:
-
-        The client generates a pair of 16-byte symmetric keys (one
-        [K_f] for the 'forward' stream from client to server, and one
-        [K_b] for the 'backward' stream from server to client) to be
-        used for link encryption.
-
-        The client then generates a 'Client authentication' message [M]
-        containing: 
-
-        (If client is an OP)
-           The number 1 to signify OP handshake [2 bytes]
-           Forward link key [K_f]               [16 bytes]
-           Backward link key [K_b]              [16 bytes]
-                                             [Total: 34 bytes]
-
-        (If client is an OR)
-           The number 2 to signify OR handshake [2 bytes]
-           The client's published IPV4 address  [4 bytes]
-           The client's published port          [2 bytes]
-           The server's published IPV4 address  [4 bytes]
-           The server's published port          [2 bytes]
-           The forward key [K_f]                [16 bytes]
-           The backward key [K_b]               [16 bytes]
-                                             [Total: 46 bytes] 
-
-        The client then RSA-encrypts [M] with the server's public key
-        and PKCS1 padding to give an encrypted message.
-
-        The client then opens a TCP connection to the server, sends
-        the 128-byte RSA-encrypted data to the server, and waits for a
-        reply.
-
-     2. The server receives the first handshake:
-
-        The OR waits for 128 bytes of data, and decrypts the resulting
-        data with its private key, checking the PKCS1 padding. If
-        the padding is invalid, it closes the connection. If the tag
-        indicates the client is an OP, and the message is 34 bytes long,
-        it performs step 2a. If the tag indicates the client is an OR,
-        and the message is 46 bytes long, it performs step 2b. Else,
-        it closes the connection.
-
-     2a. If client is an OP:
-
-        The connection is established, and the OR is ready to receive
-        cells. The server sets its keys for this connection, setting K_f
-        to the client's K_b, and K_b to the client's K_f. The handshake
-        is complete.
-
-     2b. If the client is an OR:
-
-        The server checks the list of known ORs for one with the address
-        and port given in the client's authentication. If no such OR
-        is known, or if the server is already connected to that OR, the
-        server closes the current TCP connection and stops handshaking.
-
-        The server sets its keys for this connection, setting K_f to
-        the client's K_b, and K_b to the client's K_f.
-
-        The server then creates a server authentication message [M2] as
-        follows: 
-               Client's handshake [M]                 [44 bytes]
-               A random nonce [N]                     [8 bytes]
-                                                  [Total: 52 bytes]
-
-        The server encrypts M2 with the client's public key (found
-        from the list of known routers), using PKCS1 padding.
-
-        The server sends the 128-byte encrypted message to the client,
-        and waits for a reply.
-
-     3. Client authenticates to server.
-
-        Once the client has received 128 bytes, it decrypts them with
-        its public key, and checks the PKCS1 padding.  If the padding
-        is invalid, or the decrypted message's length is other than 52
-        bytes, the client closes the TCP connection.
-
-        The client checks that the addresses and keys in the reply
-        message are the same as the ones it originally sent.  If not,
-        it closes the TCP connection.
-
-        The client generates the following authentication message [M3]:
-           The client's published IPV4 address    [4 bytes]
-           The client's published port            [2 bytes]
-           The server's published IPV4 address    [4 bytes]
-           The server's published port            [2 bytes]
-           The server-generated nonce [N]         [8 bytes]
-                                             [Total: 20 bytes]
-
-        Once again, the client encrypts this message using the
-        server's public key and PKCS1 padding, and sends the resulting
-        128-byte message to the server.
-
-     4. Server checks client authentication
-
-        The server once again waits to receive 128 bytes from the
-        client, decrypts the message with its private key, and checks
-        the PKCS1 padding.  If the padding is incorrect, or if the
-        message's length is other than 20 bytes, the server closes the
-        TCP connection and stops handshaking.
-
-        If the addresses in the decrypted message M3 match those in M
-        and M2, and if the nonce in M3 is the same as in M2, the
-        handshake is complete, and the client and server begin sending
-        cells to one another.  Otherwise, the server closes the TCP
-        connection.
-
-2.2. Sending cells and link encryption
-
-   Once the handshake is complete, the two sides send cells
-   (specified below) to one another.  Cells are sent serially,
-   encrypted with the AES-CTR keystream specified by the handshake
-   protocol.  Over a connection, communicants encrypt outgoing cells
-   with the connection's K_f, and decrypt incoming cells with the
-   connection's K_b.
-
-   [Commentary: This means that OR/OP->OR connections are malleable; I
-    can flip bits in cells as they go across the wire, and see flipped
-    bits coming out the cells as they are decrypted at the next
-    server.  I need to look more at the data format to see whether
-    this is exploitable, but if there's no integrity checking there
-    either, I suspect we may have an attack here. -NM]
-   [Yes, this protocol is open to tagging attacks. The payloads are
-    encrypted inside the network, so it's only at the edge node and beyond
-    that it's a worry. But adversaries can already count packets and
-    observe/modify timing. It's not worth putting in hashes; indeed, it
-    would be quite hard, because one of the sides of the circuit doesn't
-    know the keys that are used for de/encrypting at each hop, so couldn't
-    craft hashes anyway. See the Bandwidth Throttling (threat model)
-    thread on http://archives.seul.org/or/dev/Jul-2002/threads.html. -RD]
-   [Even if I don't control both sides of the connection, I can still
-    do evil stuff.  For instance, if I can guess that a cell is a
-    TOPIC_COMMAND_BEGIN cell to www.slashdot.org:80 , I can change the
-    address and port to point to a machine I control. -NM]
-   [We're going to address this tagging issue with e2e-only hashes.
-    See TODO file. -RD]
-
+   proxy (OP), which allows the OP to authenticate the OR without
+   authenticating itself.  The second is as another OR, which allows
+   mutual authentication.
+
+   Tor uses TLS for link encryption, using the cipher suite
+   "TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA".  An OR always sends a
+   self-signed X.509 certificate whose commonName is the server's
+   nickname, and whose public key is in the server directory.
+   
+   All parties receiving certificates must confirm that the public
+   key is as it appears in the server directory, and close the
+   connection if it does not.
+
+   Once a TLS connection is established, the two sides send cells
+   (specified below) to one another.  Cells are sent serially.  All
+   cells are 256 bytes long.  Cells may be sent embedded in TLS
+   records of any size or divided across TLS records, but the framing
+   of TLS records should not leak information about the type or
+   contents of the cells.
+
+   OR-to-OR connections are never deliberately closed.  OP-to-OR
+   connections are closed when the OP has no more circuits running
+   over a connection, and an amount of time (????) has passed.
 
 3. Cell Packet format
 

+ 2 - 2
src/common/Makefile.am

@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ noinst_LIBRARIES = libor.a
 
 #CFLAGS  = -Wall -Wpointer-arith -O2
 
-libor_a_SOURCES = log.c crypto.c fakepoll.c util.c aes.c
+libor_a_SOURCES = log.c crypto.c fakepoll.c util.c aes.c tortls.c
 
-noinst_HEADERS = log.h crypto.h fakepoll.h test.h util.h aes.h torint.h
+noinst_HEADERS = log.h crypto.h fakepoll.h test.h util.h aes.h torint.h tortls.h
 

+ 1 - 5
src/common/crypto.c

@@ -696,11 +696,6 @@ int crypto_SHA_digest(unsigned char *m, int len, unsigned char *digest)
   return (SHA1(m,len,digest) == NULL);
 }
 
-
-struct crypto_dh_env_st {
-  DH *dh;
-};
-
 static BIGNUM *dh_param_p = NULL;
 static BIGNUM *dh_param_g = NULL;
 
@@ -735,6 +730,7 @@ static void init_dh_param() {
      supposedly it equals:
         2^1024 - 2^960 - 1 + 2^64 * { [2^894 pi] + 129093 }.
   */
+  /* See also rfc 3536 */
   r = BN_hex2bn(&p,
 		"FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFC90FDAA22168C234C4C6628B80DC1CD129024E08"
 		"8A67CC74020BBEA63B139B22514A08798E3404DDEF9519B3CD3A431B"

+ 5 - 1
src/common/crypto.h

@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@
 
 #include <stdio.h>
 #include <openssl/rsa.h>
+#include <openssl/dh.h>
 
 /* available encryption primitives */
 #define CRYPTO_CIPHER_IDENTITY 0
@@ -72,7 +73,10 @@ int base64_encode(char *dest, int destlen, char *src, int srclen);
 int base64_decode(char *dest, int destlen, char *src, int srclen);
 
 /* Key negotiation */
-typedef struct crypto_dh_env_st crypto_dh_env_t;
+typedef struct crypto_dh_env_st {
+  DH *dh;
+} crypto_dh_env_t;
+
 /* #define CRYPTO_DH_SIZE (1536 / 8) */
 #define CRYPTO_DH_SIZE (1024 / 8)
 crypto_dh_env_t *crypto_dh_new();

+ 323 - 0
src/common/tortls.c

@@ -0,0 +1,323 @@
+/* Copyright 2003 Roger Dingledine. */
+/* See LICENSE for licensing information */
+/* $Id$ */
+
+/* TLS wrappers for The Onion Router.  (Unlike other tor functions, these
+ * are prefixed with tor_ in order to avoid conflicting with OpenSSL
+ * functions and variables.)
+ */
+
+#include "./crypto.h"
+#include "./tortls.h"
+#include "./util.h"
+
+#include <assert.h>
+#include <openssl/ssl.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/tls1.h>
+#include <openssl/asn1.h>
+#include <openssl/bio.h>
+
+struct tor_tls_context_st {
+  SSL_CTX *ctx;
+};
+
+struct tor_tls_st {
+  SSL *ssl;
+  int socket;
+  enum { 
+    TOR_TLS_ST_HANDSHAKE, TOR_TLS_ST_OPEN, TOR_TLS_ST_GOTCLOSE, 
+    TOR_TLS_ST_SENTCLOSE, TOR_TLS_ST_CLOSED
+  } state;
+  int isServer;
+};
+
+#define _TOR_TLS_SYSCALL    -6
+#define _TOR_TLS_ZERORETURN -5
+
+static int
+tor_tls_get_error(tor_tls *tls, int r, int extra)
+{
+  int err = SSL_get_error(tls->ssl, r);
+  switch (err) {
+    case SSL_ERROR_NONE:
+      return TOR_TLS_DONE;
+    case SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ:
+      return TOR_TLS_WANTREAD;
+    case SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE:
+      return TOR_TLS_WANTWRITE;
+    case SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL:
+      return extra ? _TOR_TLS_SYSCALL : TOR_TLS_ERROR;
+    case SSL_ERROR_ZERO_RETURN:
+      return extra ? _TOR_TLS_ZERORETURN : TOR_TLS_ERROR;
+    default:
+      return TOR_TLS_ERROR;
+  }
+}
+
+static int always_accept_verify_cb(int preverify_ok, 
+                                   X509_STORE_CTX *x509_ctx)
+{
+  /* XXXX Actually, this needs to get more complicated.  But for now,
+     XXXX always accept peer certs. */
+  return 1;
+}
+
+/* Generate a self-signed certificate with the private key 'rsa' and
+ * commonName 'nickname', and write it, PEM-encoded, to the file named
+ * by 'certfile'.  Return 0 on success, -1 for failure.
+ */
+int
+tor_tls_write_certificate(char *certfile, crypto_pk_env_t *rsa, char *nickname)
+{
+  RSA *_rsa = NULL;
+  time_t start_time, end_time;
+  EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
+  X509 *x509 = NULL;
+  X509_NAME *name = NULL;
+  BIO *out = NULL;
+  int nid;
+  
+  start_time = time(NULL);
+
+  assert(rsa && rsa->type == CRYPTO_PK_RSA);
+  if (!(_rsa = RSAPrivateKey_dup((RSA*)rsa->key)))
+    return -1;
+  if (!(pkey = EVP_PKEY_new()))
+    return -1;
+  if (!(EVP_PKEY_assign_RSA(pkey, _rsa)))
+    return -1;
+  if (!(x509 = X509_new()))
+    return -1;
+  if (!(X509_set_version(x509, 2)))
+    return -1;
+  if (!(ASN1_INTEGER_set(X509_get_serialNumber(x509), (long)start_time)))
+    return -1;
+  
+  if (!(name = X509_NAME_new()))
+    return -1;
+  if ((nid = OBJ_txt2nid("organizationName")) != NID_undef) return -1;
+  if (!(X509_NAME_add_entry_by_NID(name, nid, MBSTRING_ASC,
+                                   "TOR", -1, -1, 0))) return -1;
+  if ((nid = OBJ_txt2nid("commonName")) != NID_undef) return -1;
+  if (!(X509_NAME_add_entry_by_NID(name, nid, MBSTRING_ASC,
+                                   nickname, -1, -1, 0))) return -1;
+  
+  if (!(X509_set_issuer_name(x509, name)))
+    return -1;
+  if (!(X509_set_subject_name(x509, name)))
+    return -1;
+  if (!X509_time_adj(X509_get_notBefore(x509),0,&start_time))
+    return -1;
+  end_time = start_time + 24*60*60*365;
+  if (!X509_time_adj(X509_get_notAfter(x509),0,&end_time))
+    return -1;
+  if (!X509_set_pubkey(x509, pkey))
+    return -1;
+  if (!X509_sign(x509, pkey, EVP_sha1()))
+    return -1;
+  if (!(out = BIO_new_file(certfile, "w")))
+    return -1;
+  if (!(PEM_write_bio_X509(out, x509)))
+    return -1;
+  BIO_free(out);
+  X509_free(x509);
+  EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
+  X509_NAME_free(name);
+  return 0;
+}
+
+/* Create a new TLS context.  If we are going to be using it as a
+ * server, it must have isServer set to true, certfile set to a
+ * filename for a certificate file, and RSA set to the private key
+ * used for that certificate.
+ */
+tor_tls_context *
+tor_tls_context_new(char *certfile, crypto_pk_env_t *rsa, int isServer)
+{
+  assert(!rsa || rsa->type == CRYPTO_PK_RSA);
+  assert((certfile && rsa) || (!certfile && !rsa));
+  crypto_dh_env_t *dh = NULL;
+  RSA *_rsa = NULL;
+  EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
+  tor_tls_context *result;
+
+  result = tor_malloc(sizeof(tor_tls_context));
+  if (!(result->ctx = SSL_CTX_new(TLSv1_method())))
+    return NULL;
+  /* XXXX This should use AES, but we'll need to require OpenSSL 0.9.7 first */
+  if (!SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list(result->ctx, TLS1_TXT_DHE_DSS_WITH_RC4_128_SHA))
+                               /* TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA)) */
+    return NULL;
+  if (certfile && !SSL_CTX_use_certificate_file(result->ctx,certfile,
+                                                SSL_FILETYPE_PEM))
+    return NULL;
+  SSL_CTX_set_session_cache_mode(result->ctx, SSL_SESS_CACHE_OFF);
+  if (rsa) {
+    if (!(_rsa = RSAPrivateKey_dup((RSA*)rsa->key)))
+      return NULL;
+    if (!(pkey = EVP_PKEY_new()))
+      return NULL;
+    if (!EVP_PKEY_assign_RSA(pkey, _rsa))
+      return NULL;
+    if (!SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey(result->ctx, pkey))
+      return NULL;
+    EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
+    if (certfile) {
+      if (!SSL_CTX_check_private_key(result->ctx))
+        return NULL;
+    }
+  }
+  dh = crypto_dh_new();
+  SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh(result->ctx, dh->dh);
+  crypto_dh_free(dh);
+  SSL_CTX_set_verify(result->ctx, SSL_VERIFY_PEER, 
+                     always_accept_verify_cb);
+  
+  return result;
+}
+
+/* Create a new TLS object from a TLS context, a filedescriptor, and 
+ * a flag to determine whether it is functioning as a server.
+ */
+tor_tls *
+tor_tls_new(tor_tls_context *ctx, int sock, int isServer)
+{
+  tor_tls *result = tor_malloc(sizeof(tor_tls));
+  if (!(result->ssl = SSL_new(ctx->ctx)))
+    return NULL;
+  result->socket = sock;
+  SSL_set_fd(result->ssl, sock);
+  result->state = TOR_TLS_ST_HANDSHAKE;
+  result->isServer = isServer;
+  return result;
+}
+
+/* Release resources associated with a TLS object.  Does not close the
+ * underlying file descriptor.
+ */
+void
+tor_tls_free(tor_tls *tls)
+{
+  SSL_free(tls->ssl);
+  free(tls);
+}
+
+/* Underlying function for TLS reading.  Reads up to 'len' characters
+ * from 'tls' into 'cp'.  On success, returns the number of characters
+ * read.  On failure, returns TOR_TLS_ERROR, TOR_TLS_CLOSE,
+ * TOR_TLS_WANTREAD, or TOR_TLS_WANTWRITE.
+ */
+int
+tor_tls_read(tor_tls *tls, char *cp, int len)
+{
+  int r, err;
+  assert(tls && tls->ssl);
+  assert(tls->state == TOR_TLS_ST_OPEN);
+  r = SSL_read(tls->ssl, cp, len);
+  if (r > 0)
+    return r;
+  err = tor_tls_get_error(tls, r, 1);
+  if (err == _TOR_TLS_SYSCALL)
+    return TOR_TLS_ERROR;
+  else if (err == _TOR_TLS_ZERORETURN) {
+    tls->state = TOR_TLS_ST_CLOSED;
+    return TOR_TLS_CLOSE;
+  } else {
+    /*  XXXX Make sure it's not TOR_TLS_DONE. */
+    return err;
+  }
+}
+
+/* Underlying function for TLS writing.  Write up to 'n' characters
+ * from 'cp' onto 'tls'.  On success, returns the number of characters
+ * written.  On failure, returns TOR_TLS_ERROR, TOR_TLS_WANTREAD, 
+ * or TOR_TLS_WANTWRITE.
+ */
+int
+tor_tls_write(tor_tls *tls, char *cp, int n)
+{
+  int r, err;
+  assert(tls && tls->ssl);
+  assert(tls->state == TOR_TLS_ST_OPEN);
+  r = SSL_write(tls->ssl, cp, n);
+  err = tor_tls_get_error(tls, r, 1);
+  if (err == _TOR_TLS_ZERORETURN) {
+    /* should never happen XXXX */
+    return 0;
+  } else if (err == TOR_TLS_DONE) {
+    return r;
+  } else {
+    return err;
+  }  
+}
+
+/* Perform initial handshake on 'tls'.  When finished, returns
+ * TOR_TLS_DONE.  On failure, returns TOR_TLS_ERROR, TOR_TLS_WANTREAD,
+ * or TOR_TLS_WANNTWRITE.
+ */
+int
+tor_tls_handshake(tor_tls *tls)
+{
+  int r;
+  assert(tls && tls->ssl);
+  assert(tls->state == TOR_TLS_ST_HANDSHAKE);
+  if (tls->isServer) {
+    r = SSL_accept(tls->ssl);
+  } else {
+    r = SSL_connect(tls->ssl);
+  }
+  r = tor_tls_get_error(tls,r,0);
+  if (r == TOR_TLS_DONE) {
+    tls->state = TOR_TLS_ST_OPEN; 
+  }
+  return r;
+}
+
+/* Shut down an open tls connection 'tls'.  When finished, returns
+ * TOR_TLS_DONE.  On failure, returns TOR_TLS_ERROR, TOR_TLS_WANTREAD,
+ * or TOR_TLS_WANTWRITE.
+ */
+int
+tor_tls_shutdown(tor_tls *tls)
+{
+  int r, err;
+  char buf[128];
+  assert(tls && tls->ssl);
+
+  if (tls->state == TOR_TLS_ST_SENTCLOSE) {
+    do {
+      r = SSL_read(tls->ssl, buf, 128);
+    } while (r>0);
+    err = tor_tls_get_error(tls, r, 1);
+    if (err == _TOR_TLS_ZERORETURN) {
+      tls->state = TOR_TLS_ST_GOTCLOSE;
+      /* fall through */
+    } else {
+      if (err == _TOR_TLS_SYSCALL)
+        err = TOR_TLS_ERROR;
+      return err;
+    }
+  }
+
+  r = SSL_shutdown(tls->ssl);
+  if (r == 1) {
+    tls->state = TOR_TLS_ST_CLOSED;
+    return TOR_TLS_DONE;
+  }
+  err = tor_tls_get_error(tls, r, 1);
+  if (err == _TOR_TLS_SYSCALL)
+    return TOR_TLS_ST_CLOSED; /* XXXX is this right? */
+  else if (err == _TOR_TLS_ZERORETURN) {
+    if (tls->state == TOR_TLS_ST_GOTCLOSE || 
+        tls->state == TOR_TLS_ST_SENTCLOSE) {
+      /* XXXX log; unexpected. */
+      return TOR_TLS_ERROR;
+    }
+    tls->state = TOR_TLS_ST_SENTCLOSE;
+    return tor_tls_shutdown(tls);
+  } else {
+    /* XXXX log if not error. */
+    return err;
+  }
+}

+ 29 - 0
src/common/tortls.h

@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
+/* Copyright 2003 Roger Dingledine */
+/* See LICENSE for licensing information */
+/* $Id$ */
+
+#ifndef _TORTLS_H
+#define _TORTLS_H
+
+#include "../common/crypto.h"
+
+typedef struct tor_tls_context_st tor_tls_context;
+typedef struct tor_tls_st tor_tls;
+
+#define TOR_TLS_ERROR       -4
+#define TOR_TLS_CLOSE       -3
+#define TOR_TLS_WANTREAD    -2
+#define TOR_TLS_WANTWRITE   -1
+#define TOR_TLS_DONE         0
+
+int tor_tls_write_certificate(char *certfile, crypto_pk_env_t *rsa, char *nickname);
+tor_tls_context *tor_tls_context_new(char *certfile, crypto_pk_env_t *rsa, int isServer);
+tor_tls *tor_tls_new(tor_tls_context *ctx, int sock, int isServer);
+void tor_tls_free(tor_tls *tls);
+int tor_tls_read(tor_tls *tls, char *cp, int len);
+int tor_tls_write(tor_tls *tls, char *cp, int n);
+int tor_tls_handshake(tor_tls *tls);
+/* XXXX we need a function to check for validated, verified peer certs. */
+int tor_tls_shutdown(tor_tls *tls);
+
+#endif

+ 33 - 0
src/or/buffers.c

@@ -86,6 +86,23 @@ int read_to_buf(int s, int at_most, char **buf, int *buflen, int *buf_datalen, i
   }
 }
 
+int read_to_buf_tls(tor_tls *tls, int at_most, char **buf, int *buflen, int *buf_datalen) {
+  int r;
+  assert(tls && *buf && buflen && buf_datalen);
+  
+  if (at_most > *buflen - *buf_datalen)
+    at_most = *buflen - *buf_datalen;
+
+  if (at_most == 0)
+    return 0;
+  
+  r = tor_tls_read(tls, *buf+*buf_datalen, at_most);
+  if (r<0) 
+    return r;
+  *buf_datalen += r;
+  return r;
+} 
+
 int flush_buf(int s, char **buf, int *buflen, int *buf_flushlen, int *buf_datalen) {
 
   /* push from buf onto s
@@ -127,6 +144,22 @@ int flush_buf(int s, char **buf, int *buflen, int *buf_flushlen, int *buf_datale
   }
 }
 
+int flush_buf_tls(tor_tls *tls, char **buf, int *buflen, int *buf_flushlen, int *buf_datalen)
+{
+  int r;
+  assert(tls && *buf && buflen && buf_datalen);
+  if (*buf_flushlen == 0)
+    return 0;
+  r = tor_tls_write(tls, *buf, *buf_flushlen);
+  if (r < 0) {
+    return r;
+  }
+  *buf_datalen -= r;
+  *buf_flushlen -= r;
+  memmove(*buf, *buf+r, *buf_datalen);
+  return r;
+}
+
 int write_to_buf(char *string, int string_len,
                  char **buf, int *buflen, int *buf_datalen) {
 

+ 7 - 1
src/or/or.h

@@ -90,6 +90,7 @@
 #endif
 
 #include "../common/crypto.h"
+#include "../common/tortls.h"
 #include "../common/log.h"
 #include "../common/util.h"
 
@@ -482,11 +483,17 @@ void buf_free(char *buf);
 
 int read_to_buf(int s, int at_most, char **buf, int *buflen, int *buf_datalen, int *reached_eof);
   /* grab from s, put onto buf, return how many bytes read */
+int read_to_buf_tls(tor_tls *tls, int at_most, char **buf, int *buflen, int *buf_datalen);
+  /* grab from s, put onto buf, return how many bytes read or a TLS
+   * status (same status codes as tor_tls_read) */
 
 int flush_buf(int s, char **buf, int *buflen, int *buf_flushlen, int *buf_datalen);
   /* push from buf onto s
    * then memmove to front of buf
    * return -1 or how many bytes remain on the buf */
+int flush_buf_tls(tor_tls *tls, char **buf, int *buflen, int *buf_flushlen, int *buf_datalen);
+  /* As flush_buf, but returns number of bytes written or TLS status
+   * (same status codes as tor_tls_write) */
 
 int write_to_buf(char *string, int string_len,
                  char **buf, int *buflen, int *buf_datalen);
@@ -494,7 +501,6 @@ int write_to_buf(char *string, int string_len,
    * return total number of bytes on the buf
    */
 
-
 int fetch_from_buf(char *string, int string_len,
                    char **buf, int *buflen, int *buf_datalen);
   /* if there is string_len bytes in buf, write them onto string,