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  1. .TH TOR 1 "January 2006" "TOR"
  2. .SH NAME
  3. tor \- The second-generation onion router
  4. .SH SYNOPSIS
  5. .B tor
  6. [\fIOPTION value\fR]...
  7. .SH DESCRIPTION
  8. .I tor
  9. is a connection-oriented anonymizing communication
  10. service. Users choose a source-routed path through a set of nodes, and
  11. negotiate a "virtual circuit" through the network, in which each node
  12. knows its predecessor and successor, but no others. Traffic flowing down
  13. the circuit is unwrapped by a symmetric key at each node, which reveals
  14. the downstream node.
  15. .PP
  16. Basically \fItor\fR provides a distributed network of servers ("onion
  17. routers"). Users bounce their TCP streams -- web traffic, ftp, ssh, etc --
  18. around the routers, and recipients, observers, and even the routers
  19. themselves have difficulty tracking the source of the stream.
  20. .SH OPTIONS
  21. \fB-h, -help\fP
  22. Display a short help message and exit.
  23. .LP
  24. .TP
  25. \fB-f \fR\fIFILE\fP
  26. FILE contains further "option value" pairs. (Default: @CONFDIR@/torrc)
  27. .LP
  28. .TP
  29. \fB--hash-password\fP
  30. Generates a hashed password for control port access.
  31. .LP
  32. .TP
  33. \fB--list-fingerprint\fP
  34. Generate your keys and output your nickname and fingerprint.
  35. .LP
  36. .TP
  37. \fB--verify-config\fP
  38. Verify the configuration file is valid.
  39. .LP
  40. .TP
  41. \fB--nt-service\fP
  42. \fB--service [install|remove|start|stop]\fP
  43. Manage the Tor Windows NT/2000/XP service. Current instructions can
  44. be found at http://wiki.noreply.org/noreply/TheOnionRouter/TorFAQ#WinNTService
  45. .LP
  46. .TP
  47. \fB--list-torrc-options\fP
  48. List all valid options.
  49. .LP
  50. .TP
  51. \fB--version\fP
  52. Display Tor version.
  53. .LP
  54. .TP
  55. Other options can be specified either on the command-line (\fI--option
  56. value\fR), or in the configuration file (\fIoption value\fR).
  57. Options are case-insensitive.
  58. .LP
  59. .TP
  60. \fBBandwidthRate \fR\fIN\fR \fBbytes\fR|\fBKB\fR|\fBMB\fR|\fBGB\fR|\fBTB\fP
  61. A token bucket limits the average incoming bandwidth usage on this node
  62. to the specified number of bytes per second, and the average outgoing
  63. bandwidth usage to that same value. (Default: 3 MB)
  64. .LP
  65. .TP
  66. \fBBandwidthBurst \fR\fIN\fR \fBbytes\fR|\fBKB\fR|\fBMB\fR|\fBGB\fR|\fBTB\fP
  67. Limit the maximum token bucket size (also known as the burst) to the
  68. given number of bytes in each direction. (Default: 6 MB)
  69. .LP
  70. .TP
  71. \fBMaxAdvertisedBandwidth \fR\fIN\fR \fBbytes\fR|\fBKB\fR|\fBMB\fR|\fBGB\fR|\fBTB\fP
  72. If set, we will not advertise more than this amount of bandwidth for our
  73. BandwidthRate. Server operators who want to reduce the number of clients
  74. who ask to build circuits through them (since this is proportional to
  75. advertised bandwidth rate) can thus reduce the CPU demands on their
  76. server without impacting network performance.
  77. .LP
  78. .TP
  79. \fBRelayBandwidthRate \fR\fIN\fR \fBbytes\fR|\fBKB\fR|\fBMB\fR|\fBGB\fR|\fBTB\fP
  80. If defined, a separate token bucket limits the average incoming bandwidth
  81. usage for _relayed traffic_ on this node to the specified number of
  82. bytes per second, and the average outgoing bandwidth usage to that same
  83. value. Relayed traffic is currently defined as answers to directory
  84. requests, but that may change. (Default: 0)
  85. .LP
  86. .TP
  87. \fBRelayBandwidthBurst \fR\fIN\fR \fBbytes\fR|\fBKB\fR|\fBMB\fR|\fBGB\fR|\fBTB\fP
  88. Limit the maximum token bucket size (also known as the burst) for
  89. _relayed traffic_ to the
  90. given number of bytes in each direction. (Default: 0)
  91. .LP
  92. .TP
  93. \fBConnLimit \fR\fINUM\fP
  94. The minimum number of file descriptors that must be available to
  95. the Tor process before it will start. Tor will ask the OS for as
  96. many file descriptors as the OS will allow (you can find this
  97. by "ulimit -H -n"). If this number is less than ConnLimit, then
  98. Tor will refuse to start.
  99. You probably don't need to adjust this. It has no effect on
  100. Windows since that platform lacks getrlimit(). (Default: 1000)
  101. .LP
  102. .TP
  103. \fBConstrainedSockets \fR\fB0\fR|\fB1\fR\fP
  104. If set, Tor will tell the kernel to attempt to shrink the buffers for all
  105. sockets to the size specified in \fBConstrainedSockSize\fP. This is useful
  106. for virtual servers and other environments where system level TCP
  107. buffers may be limited. If you're on a virtual server, and you
  108. encounter the "Error creating network
  109. socket: No buffer space available" message, you are likely experiencing
  110. this problem.
  111. The preferred solution is to have the admin increase the buffer pool for
  112. the host itself via /proc/sys/net/ipv4/tcp_mem or equivalent facility; this
  113. configuration option is a second-resort.
  114. The DirPort option should also not be used if TCP buffers are scarce. The
  115. cached directory requests consume additional sockets which exacerbates the
  116. problem.
  117. You should \fBnot\fP enable this feature unless you encounter the "no buffer
  118. space available" issue. Reducing the TCP buffers affects window size for
  119. for the TCP stream and will reduce throughput in proportion to round trip
  120. time on long paths. (Default: 0.)
  121. .LP
  122. .TP
  123. \fBConstrainedSockSize \fR\fIN\fR \fBbytes\fR|\fBKB\fP
  124. When \fBConstrainedSockets\fP is enabled the receive and transmit buffers for
  125. all sockets will be set to this limit. Must be a value between 2048
  126. and 262144, in 1024 byte increments. Default of 8192 is recommended.
  127. .LP
  128. .TP
  129. \fBControlPort \fR\fIPort\fP
  130. If set, Tor will accept connections on this port and allow those
  131. connections to control the Tor process using the Tor Control Protocol
  132. (described in control-spec.txt). Note: unless you also specify one of
  133. \fBHashedControlPassword\fP or \fBCookieAuthentication\fP, setting
  134. this option will cause Tor to allow any process on the local host to
  135. control it. This option is required for many Tor controllers; most use
  136. the value of 9051.
  137. .LP
  138. .TP
  139. \fBControlListenAddress \fR\fIIP\fR[:\fIPORT\fR]\fP
  140. Bind the controller listener to this address. If you specify a port,
  141. bind to this port rather than the one specified in ControlPort. We
  142. strongly recommend that you leave this alone unless you know what you're
  143. doing, since giving attackers access to your control listener is really
  144. dangerous. (Default: 127.0.0.1)
  145. This directive can be specified multiple times to bind to multiple
  146. addresses/ports.
  147. .LP
  148. .TP
  149. \fBControlSocket \fR\fIPath\fP
  150. Like ControlPort, but listens on a Unix domain socket, rather than a TCP
  151. socket. (Unix and Unix-like systems only.)
  152. .LP
  153. .TP
  154. \fBHashedControlPassword \fR\fIhashed_password\fP
  155. Don't allow any connections on the control port except when the other process
  156. knows the password whose one-way hash is \fIhashed_password\fP. You can
  157. compute the hash of a password by running "tor --hash-password
  158. \fIpassword\fP".
  159. .LP
  160. .TP
  161. \fBCookieAuthentication \fR\fB0\fR|\fB1\fP
  162. If this option is set to 1, don't allow any connections on the control port
  163. except when the connecting process knows the contents of a file named
  164. "control_auth_cookie", which Tor will create in its data directory. This
  165. authentication method should only be used on systems with good filesystem
  166. security. (Default: 0)
  167. .LP
  168. .TP
  169. \fBCookieAuthFile \fR\fIPath\fP
  170. If set, this option overrides the default location and file name for Tor's
  171. cookie file. (See CookieAuthentication above.)
  172. .LP
  173. .TP
  174. \fBCookieAuthFileGroupReadable \fR\fB0\fR|\fB1\fR|\fIGroupName\fP
  175. If this option is set to 0, don't allow the filesystem group to read
  176. the cookie file. If the option is set to 1, make the cookie file
  177. readable by the default GID. [Making the file readable by other
  178. groups is not yet implemented; let us know if you need this for some
  179. reason.] (Default: 0).
  180. .LP
  181. .TP
  182. \fBDataDirectory \fR\fIDIR\fP
  183. Store working data in DIR (Default: @LOCALSTATEDIR@/lib/tor)
  184. .LP
  185. .TP
  186. \fBDirServer \fR[\fInickname\fR] [\fBflags\fR] \fIaddress\fR\fB:\fIport fingerprint\fP
  187. Use a nonstandard authoritative directory server at the provided
  188. address and port, with the specified key fingerprint. This option can
  189. be repeated many times, for multiple authoritative directory
  190. servers. Flags are separated by spaces, and determine what kind of an
  191. authority this directory is. By default, every authority is authoritative
  192. for current ("v2")-style directories, unless the "no-v2" flag is given. If the "v1" flags is provided, Tor will use this server as an
  193. authority for old-style (v1) directories as well. (Only directory mirrors
  194. care about this.) Tor will use this server as an authority for hidden
  195. service information if the "hs" flag is set, or if the "v1" flag is set and
  196. the "no-hs" flag is \fBnot\fP set. Tor will use this authority as a bridge
  197. authoritative directory if the "bridge" flag is set. Lastly, if a flag
  198. "orport=\fBport\fR" is given, Tor will use the given port when opening
  199. encrypted tunnels to the dirserver.
  200. If no \fBdirserver\fP line is given, Tor will use the default
  201. directory servers. NOTE: this option is intended
  202. for setting up a private Tor network with its own directory authorities. If
  203. you use it, you will be distinguishable from other users, because you won't
  204. believe the same authorities they do.
  205. .LP
  206. .TP
  207. \fBFetchHidServDescriptors \fR\fB0\fR|\fB1\fR\fP
  208. If set to 0, Tor will never fetch any hidden service descriptors from
  209. the rendezvous directories. This option is only useful if you're using
  210. a Tor controller that handles hidserv fetches for you.
  211. (Default: 1)
  212. .LP
  213. .TP
  214. \fBFetchServerDescriptors \fR\fB0\fR|\fB1\fR\fP
  215. If set to 0, Tor will never fetch any network status summaries or server
  216. descriptors from the directory servers. This option is only useful if
  217. you're using a Tor controller that handles directory fetches for you.
  218. (Default: 1)
  219. .LP
  220. .TP
  221. \fBFetchUselessDescriptors \fR\fB0\fR|\fB1\fR\fP
  222. If set to 1, Tor will fetch every non-obsolete descriptor from the
  223. authorities that it hears about. Otherwise, it will avoid fetching
  224. useless descriptors, for example for routers that are not running.
  225. This option is useful if you're using the contributed "exitlist"
  226. script to enumerate Tor nodes that exit to certain addresses.
  227. (Default: 0)
  228. .LP
  229. .TP
  230. \fBGroup \fR\fIGID\fP
  231. On startup, setgid to this group.
  232. .LP
  233. .TP
  234. \fBHttpProxy\fR \fIhost\fR[:\fIport\fR]\fP
  235. Tor will make all its directory requests through this host:port
  236. (or host:80 if port is not specified),
  237. rather than connecting directly to any directory servers.
  238. .LP
  239. .TP
  240. \fBHttpProxyAuthenticator\fR \fIusername:password\fP
  241. If defined, Tor will use this username:password for Basic Http proxy
  242. authentication, as in RFC 2617. This is currently the only form of
  243. Http proxy authentication that Tor supports; feel free to submit a
  244. patch if you want it to support others.
  245. .LP
  246. .TP
  247. \fBHttpsProxy\fR \fIhost\fR[:\fIport\fR]\fP
  248. Tor will make all its OR (SSL) connections through this host:port
  249. (or host:443 if port is not specified), via HTTP CONNECT rather than
  250. connecting directly to servers. You may want to set \fBFascistFirewall\fR
  251. to restrict the set of ports you might try to connect to, if your Https
  252. proxy only allows connecting to certain ports.
  253. .LP
  254. .TP
  255. \fBHttpsProxyAuthenticator\fR \fIusername:password\fP
  256. If defined, Tor will use this username:password for Basic Https proxy
  257. authentication, as in RFC 2617. This is currently the only form of
  258. Https proxy authentication that Tor supports; feel free to submit a
  259. patch if you want it to support others.
  260. .LP
  261. .TP
  262. \fBKeepalivePeriod \fR\fINUM\fP
  263. To keep firewalls from expiring connections, send a padding keepalive
  264. cell every NUM seconds on open connections that are in use. If the
  265. connection has no open circuits, it will instead be closed after NUM
  266. seconds of idleness. (Default: 5 minutes)
  267. .LP
  268. .TP
  269. \fBLog \fR\fIminSeverity\fR[-\fImaxSeverity\fR] \fBstderr\fR|\fBstdout\fR|\fBsyslog\fR\fP
  270. Send all messages between \fIminSeverity\fR and \fImaxSeverity\fR to
  271. the standard output stream, the standard error stream, or to the system
  272. log. (The "syslog" value is only supported on Unix.) Recognized
  273. severity levels are debug, info, notice, warn, and err. We advise using
  274. "notice" in most cases, since anything more verbose may provide sensitive
  275. information to an attacker who obtains the logs. If only one
  276. severity level is given, all messages of that level or higher will be
  277. sent to the listed destination.
  278. .LP
  279. .TP
  280. \fBLog \fR\fIminSeverity\fR[-\fImaxSeverity\fR] \fBfile\fR \fIFILENAME\fP
  281. As above, but send log messages to the listed filename. The "Log"
  282. option may appear more than once in a configuration file. Messages
  283. are sent to all the logs that match their severity level.
  284. .LP
  285. .TP
  286. \fBOutboundBindAddress \fR\fIIP\fP
  287. Make all outbound connections originate from the IP address specified. This
  288. is only useful when you have multiple network interfaces, and you want all
  289. of Tor's outgoing connections to use a single one.
  290. .LP
  291. .TP
  292. \fBPidFile \fR\fIFILE\fP
  293. On startup, write our PID to FILE. On clean shutdown, remove FILE.
  294. .LP
  295. .TP
  296. \fBProtocolWarnings \fR\fB0\fR|\fB1\fR\fP
  297. If 1, Tor will log with severity 'warn' various cases of other parties
  298. not following the Tor specification. Otherwise, they are logged with
  299. severity 'info'. (Default: 0)
  300. .LP
  301. .TP
  302. \fBRunAsDaemon \fR\fB0\fR|\fB1\fR\fP
  303. If 1, Tor forks and daemonizes to the background. This option has
  304. no effect on Windows; instead you should use the --service command-line
  305. option. (Default: 0)
  306. .LP
  307. .TP
  308. \fBSafeLogging \fR\fB0\fR|\fB1\fP
  309. If 1, Tor replaces potentially sensitive strings in the logs
  310. (e.g. addresses) with the string [scrubbed]. This way logs can still be
  311. useful, but they don't leave behind personally identifying information
  312. about what sites a user might have visited. (Default: 1)
  313. .LP
  314. .TP
  315. \fBUser \fR\fIUID\fP
  316. On startup, setuid to this user.
  317. .LP
  318. .TP
  319. \fBHardwareAccel \fR\fB0\fR|\fB1\fP
  320. If non-zero, try to use crypto hardware acceleration when
  321. available. This is untested and probably buggy. (Default: 0)
  322. .LP
  323. .TP
  324. \fBAvoidDiskWrites \fR\fB0\fR|\fB1\fP
  325. If non-zero, try to write to disk less frequently than we would otherwise.
  326. This is useful when running on flash memory or other media that support only
  327. a limited number of writes. (Default: 0)
  328. .LP
  329. .TP
  330. \fBTunnelDirConns \fR\fB0\fR|\fB1\fP
  331. If non-zero, when a directory server we contact supports it, we will
  332. build a one-hop circuit and make an encrypted connection via its
  333. ORPort. (Default: 0)
  334. .LP
  335. .TP
  336. \fBPreferTunneledDirConns \fR\fB0\fR|\fB1\fP
  337. If non-zero, we will avoid directory servers that don't support tunneled
  338. directory connections, when possible. (Default: 0)
  339. .SH CLIENT OPTIONS
  340. .PP
  341. The following options are useful only for clients (that is, if \fBSocksPort\fP is non-zero):
  342. .LP
  343. .TP
  344. \fBAllowInvalidNodes\fR \fBentry\fR|\fBexit\fR|\fBmiddle\fR|\fBintroduction\fR|\fBrendezvous\fR|...\fP
  345. If some Tor servers are obviously not working right, the directory
  346. authorities can manually mark them as invalid, meaning that it's not
  347. recommended you use them for entry or exit positions in your circuits. You
  348. can opt to use them in some circuit positions, though. The default is
  349. "middle,rendezvous", and other choices are not advised.
  350. .LP
  351. .TP
  352. \fBCircuitBuildTimeout \fR\fINUM\fP
  353. Try for at most NUM seconds when building circuits. If the circuit
  354. isn't open in that time, give up on it.
  355. (Default: 1 minute.)
  356. .LP
  357. .TP
  358. \fBCircuitIdleTimeout \fR\fINUM\fP
  359. If we have kept a clean (never used) circuit around for NUM seconds,
  360. then close it. This way when the Tor client is entirely idle, it can
  361. expire all of its circuits, and then expire its TLS connections. Also,
  362. if we end up making a circuit that is not useful for exiting any of
  363. the requests we're receiving, it won't forever take up a slot in the
  364. circuit list.
  365. (Default: 1 hour.)
  366. .LP
  367. .TP
  368. \fBClientOnly \fR\fB0\fR|\fB1\fR\fP
  369. If set to 1, Tor will under no circumstances run as a server. The default
  370. is to run as a client unless ORPort is configured. (Usually,
  371. you don't need to set this; Tor is pretty smart at figuring out whether
  372. you are reliable and high-bandwidth enough to be a useful server.)
  373. (Default: 0)
  374. .LP
  375. .TP
  376. \fBExcludeNodes \fR\fInode\fR,\fInode\fR,\fI...\fP
  377. A list of identity fingerprints or nicknames of nodes to never use when
  378. building a circuit.
  379. .LP
  380. .TP
  381. \fBEntryNodes \fR\fInode\fR,\fInode\fR,\fI...\fP
  382. A list of identity fingerprints or nicknames of preferred nodes to use for the
  383. first hop in the circuit.
  384. These are treated only as preferences unless StrictEntryNodes (see
  385. below) is also set.
  386. .LP
  387. .TP
  388. \fBExitNodes \fR\fInode\fR,\fInode\fR,\fI...\fP
  389. A list of identity fingerprints or nicknames of preferred nodes to use for the
  390. last hop in the circuit.
  391. These are treated only as preferences unless StrictExitNodes (see
  392. below) is also set.
  393. .LP
  394. .TP
  395. \fBStrictEntryNodes \fR\fB0\fR|\fB1\fR\fP
  396. If 1, Tor will never use any nodes besides those listed in "EntryNodes" for
  397. the first hop of a circuit.
  398. .LP
  399. .TP
  400. \fBStrictExitNodes \fR\fB0\fR|\fB1\fR\fP
  401. If 1, Tor will never use any nodes besides those listed in "ExitNodes" for
  402. the last hop of a circuit.
  403. .LP
  404. .TP
  405. \fBFascistFirewall \fR\fB0\fR|\fB1\fR\fP
  406. If 1, Tor will only create outgoing connections to ORs running on ports that
  407. your firewall allows (defaults to 80 and 443; see \fBFirewallPorts\fR). This will
  408. allow you to run Tor as a client behind a firewall with restrictive policies,
  409. but will not allow you to run as a server behind such a firewall.
  410. If you prefer more fine-grained control, use ReachableAddresses instead.
  411. .LP
  412. .TP
  413. \fBFirewallPorts \fR\fIPORTS\fP
  414. A list of ports that your firewall allows you to connect to. Only
  415. used when \fBFascistFirewall\fR is set. This option is deprecated; use
  416. ReachableAddresses instead. (Default: 80, 443)
  417. .LP
  418. .TP
  419. \fBReachableAddresses \fR\fIADDR\fP[\fB/\fP\fIMASK\fP][:\fIPORT\fP]...\fP
  420. A comma-separated list of IP addresses and ports that your firewall allows you
  421. to connect to. The format is as
  422. for the addresses in ExitPolicy, except that "accept" is understood
  423. unless "reject" is explicitly provided. For example, 'ReachableAddresses
  424. 99.0.0.0/8, reject 18.0.0.0/8:80, accept *:80' means that your
  425. firewall allows connections to everything inside net 99, rejects port
  426. 80 connections to net 18, and accepts connections to port 80 otherwise.
  427. (Default: 'accept *:*'.)
  428. .LP
  429. .TP
  430. \fBReachableDirAddresses \fR\fIADDR\fP[\fB/\fP\fIMASK\fP][:\fIPORT\fP]...\fP
  431. Like \fBReachableAddresses\fP, a list of addresses and ports. Tor will obey
  432. these restrictions when fetching directory information, using standard HTTP
  433. GET requests. If not set explicitly then the value of \fBReachableAddresses\fP
  434. is used. If \fBHttpProxy\fR is set then these connections will go through that
  435. proxy.
  436. .LP
  437. .TP
  438. \fBReachableORAddresses \fR\fIADDR\fP[\fB/\fP\fIMASK\fP][:\fIPORT\fP]...\fP
  439. Like \fBReachableAddresses\fP, a list of addresses and ports. Tor will obey
  440. these restrictions when connecting to Onion Routers, using TLS/SSL. If not set
  441. explicitly then the value of \fBReachableAddresses\fP is used. If
  442. \fBHttpsProxy\fR is set then these connections will go through that proxy.
  443. The separation between \fBReachableORAddresses\fP and
  444. \fBReachableDirAddresses\fP is only interesting when you are connecting through
  445. proxies (see \fBHttpProxy\fR and \fBHttpsProxy\fR). Most proxies limit TLS
  446. connections (which Tor uses to connect to Onion Routers) to port 443, and some
  447. limit HTTP GET requests (which Tor uses for fetching directory information) to
  448. port 80.
  449. .LP
  450. .TP
  451. \fBLongLivedPorts \fR\fIPORTS\fP
  452. A list of ports for services that tend to have long-running connections
  453. (e.g. chat and interactive shells). Circuits for streams that use these
  454. ports will contain only high-uptime nodes, to reduce the chance that a
  455. node will go down before the stream is finished.
  456. (Default: 21, 22, 706, 1863, 5050, 5190, 5222, 5223, 6667, 6697, 8300)
  457. .LP
  458. .TP
  459. \fBMapAddress\fR \fIaddress\fR \fInewaddress\fR
  460. When a request for address arrives to Tor, it will rewrite it to
  461. newaddress before processing it. For example, if you always want
  462. connections to www.indymedia.org to exit via \fItorserver\fR (where
  463. \fItorserver\fR is the nickname of the server),
  464. use "MapAddress www.indymedia.org www.indymedia.org.torserver.exit".
  465. .LP
  466. .TP
  467. \fBNewCircuitPeriod \fR\fINUM\fP
  468. Every NUM seconds consider whether to build a new circuit. (Default: 30 seconds)
  469. .LP
  470. .TP
  471. \fBMaxCircuitDirtiness \fR\fINUM\fP
  472. Feel free to reuse a circuit that was first used at most NUM seconds ago,
  473. but never attach a new stream to a circuit that is too old.
  474. (Default: 10 minutes)
  475. .LP
  476. .TP
  477. \fBNodeFamily \fR\fInode\fR,\fInode\fR,\fI...\fP
  478. The Tor servers, defined by their identity fingerprints or nicknames,
  479. constitute a "family" of similar or co-administered
  480. servers, so never use any two of them in the same circuit. Defining a
  481. NodeFamily is only needed when a server doesn't list the family itself
  482. (with MyFamily). This option can be used multiple times.
  483. .LP
  484. .TP
  485. \fBEnforceDistinctSubnets \fR\fB0\fR|\fB1\fR\fP
  486. If 1, Tor will not put two servers whose IP addresses are "too
  487. close" on the same circuit. Currently, two addresses are
  488. "too close" if they lie in the same /16 range. (Default: 1)
  489. .\" \fBPathlenCoinWeight \fR\fI0.0-1.0\fP
  490. .\" Paths are 3 hops plus a geometric distribution centered around this coinweight.
  491. .\" Must be >=0.0 and <1.0. (Default: 0.3) NOT USED CURRENTLY
  492. .\" .TP
  493. .LP
  494. .TP
  495. \fBRendNodes \fR\fInode\fR,\fInode\fR,\fI...\fP
  496. A list of identity fingerprints or nicknames of preferred nodes to use for the
  497. rendezvous point, if possible.
  498. .LP
  499. .TP
  500. \fBRendExcludeNodes \fR\fInode\fR,\fInode\fR,\fI...\fP
  501. A list of identity fingerprints or nicknames of nodes to never use when
  502. choosing a rendezvous point.
  503. .LP
  504. .TP
  505. \fBSocksPort \fR\fIPORT\fP
  506. Advertise this port to listen for connections from Socks-speaking
  507. applications. Set this to 0 if you don't want to allow application
  508. connections. (Default: 9050)
  509. .LP
  510. .TP
  511. \fBSocksListenAddress \fR\fIIP\fR[:\fIPORT\fR]\fP
  512. Bind to this address to listen for connections from Socks-speaking
  513. applications. (Default: 127.0.0.1) You can also specify a port
  514. (e.g. 192.168.0.1:9100).
  515. This directive can be specified multiple times to bind to multiple
  516. addresses/ports.
  517. .LP
  518. .TP
  519. \fBSocksPolicy \fR\fIpolicy\fR,\fIpolicy\fR,\fI...\fP
  520. Set an entrance policy for this server, to limit who can connect to the
  521. SocksPort and DNSPort ports.
  522. The policies have the same form as exit policies below.
  523. .LP
  524. .TP
  525. \fBSocksTimeout \fR\fINUM\fP
  526. Let a socks connection wait NUM seconds handshaking, and NUM seconds
  527. unattached waiting for an appropriate circuit, before we fail it.
  528. (Default: 2 minutes.)
  529. .LP
  530. .TP
  531. \fBTestVia \fR\fInode\fR,\fInode\fR,\fI...\fP
  532. A list of identity fingerprints or nicknames of nodes to prefer for your middle
  533. hop when building testing circuits. This option is mainly for debugging
  534. reachability problems.
  535. .LP
  536. .TP
  537. \fBTrackHostExits \fR\fIhost\fR,\fI.domain\fR,\fI...\fR\fP
  538. For each value in the comma separated list, Tor will track recent connections
  539. to hosts that match this value and attempt to
  540. reuse the same exit node for each. If the value is prepended with a '.', it is
  541. treated as matching an entire domain. If one of the values is just a '.', it
  542. means match everything. This option is useful if you frequently connect to
  543. sites that will expire all your authentication cookies (ie log you out) if
  544. your IP address changes. Note that this option does have the disadvantage of
  545. making it more clear that a given history is
  546. associated with a single user. However, most people who would wish to observe
  547. this will observe it through cookies or other protocol-specific means anyhow.
  548. .LP
  549. .TP
  550. \fBTrackHostExitsExpire \fR\fINUM\fP
  551. Since exit servers go up and down, it is desirable to expire the association
  552. between host and exit server after NUM seconds. The default
  553. is 1800 seconds (30 minutes).
  554. .LP
  555. .TP
  556. \fBUseEntryGuards \fR\fB0\fR|\fB1\fR\fP
  557. If this option is set to 1, we pick a few long-term entry servers, and
  558. try to stick with them. This is desirable because
  559. constantly changing servers increases the odds that an adversary who owns
  560. some servers will observe a fraction of your paths.
  561. (Defaults to 1.)
  562. .LP
  563. .TP
  564. \fBNumEntryGuards \fR\fINUM\fP
  565. If UseEntryGuards is set to 1, we will try to pick a total of NUM routers
  566. as long-term entries for our circuits.
  567. (Defaults to 3.)
  568. .LP
  569. .TP
  570. \fBSafeSocks \fR\fB0\fR|\fB1\fR\fP
  571. When this option is enabled, Tor will reject application connections that
  572. use unsafe variants of the socks protocol -- ones that only provide an
  573. IP address, meaning the application is doing a DNS resolve first.
  574. Specifically, these are socks4 and socks5 when not doing remote DNS.
  575. (Defaults to 0.)
  576. .LP
  577. .TP
  578. \fBTestSocks \fR\fB0\fR|\fB1\fR\fP
  579. When this option is enabled, Tor will make a notice-level log entry for
  580. each connection to the Socks port indicating whether the request used
  581. a safe socks protocol or an unsafe one (see above entry on SafeSocks).
  582. This helps to determine whether an application using Tor is possibly
  583. leaking DNS requests.
  584. (Default: 0)
  585. .LP
  586. .TP
  587. \fBVirtualAddrNetwork \fR\fIAddress\fB/\fIbits\fP
  588. When a controller asks for a virtual (unused) address with the
  589. MAPADDRESS command, Tor picks an unassigned address from this range.
  590. (Default: 127.192.0.0/10)
  591. When providing proxy server service to a network of computers using a tool like
  592. dns-proxy-tor,
  593. change this address to "10.192.0.0/10" or "172.16.0.0/12".
  594. The default \fBVirtualAddrNetwork\fP address range on a
  595. properly configured machine will route to the loopback interface.
  596. For local use, no change to the
  597. default \fBVirtualAddrNetwork\fP setting is needed.
  598. .LP
  599. .TP
  600. \fBAllowNonRFC953Hostnames \fR\fB0\fR|\fB1\fR\fP
  601. When this option is disabled, Tor blocks hostnames containing illegal
  602. characters (like @ and :) rather than sending them to an exit node to be
  603. resolved. This helps trap accidental attempts to resolve URLs and so on.
  604. (Default: 0)
  605. .LP
  606. .TP
  607. \fBFastFirstHopPK \fR\fB0\fR|\fB1\fR\fP
  608. When this option is enabled and we aren't running as a server, Tor
  609. skips the public key step for the first hop of creating circuits. This is
  610. safe since we have already used TLS to authenticate the server and to
  611. establish forward-secure keys. Turning this option off makes circuit
  612. building slower.
  613. (Default: 1)
  614. .LP
  615. .TP
  616. \fBTransPort\fP \fR\fIPORT\fP
  617. If non-zero, enables transparent proxy support on \fR\fIPORT\fP (by
  618. convention, 9040).
  619. .\" This is required to enable support for \fBdns-proxy-tor\fP.
  620. .\" ControlPort must be set when using \fBTransPort\fP.
  621. Requires OS support for transparent proxies, such as BSDs' pf or
  622. Linux's IPTables.
  623. If you're planning
  624. to use Tor as a transparent proxy for a network, you'll want to examine
  625. and change VirtualAddrNetwork from the default setting. You'll also want
  626. to set the TransListenAddress option for the network you'd like to proxy.
  627. (Default: 0).
  628. .LP
  629. .TP
  630. \fBTransListenAddress\fP \fR\fIIP\fR[:\fIPORT\fR]\fP
  631. Bind to this address to listen for transparent proxy connections.
  632. (Default: 127.0.0.1).
  633. This is useful for exporting a transparent proxy server
  634. to an entire network.
  635. .LP
  636. .TP
  637. \fBNATDPort\fP \fR\fIPORT\fP
  638. Allow old versions of ipfw (as included in old versions of FreeBSD,
  639. etc.) to send connections through Tor using the NATD protocol.
  640. This option is only for people who cannot
  641. use TransPort.
  642. .LP
  643. .TP
  644. \fBNATDListenAddress\fP \fR\fIIP\fR[:\fIPORT\fR]\fP
  645. Bind to this address to listen for NATD connections.
  646. (Default: 127.0.0.1).
  647. .LP
  648. .TP
  649. \fBAutomapHostsOnResolve\fP \fR\fB0\fR|\fB1\fR\fP
  650. When this option is enabled, and we get a request to resolve an
  651. address that ends with one of the suffixes in
  652. \fBAutomapHostsSuffixes\fP, we map an unused virtual address to that
  653. address, and return the new virtual address. This is handy for making
  654. .onion addresses work with applications that resolve an address and
  655. then connect to it.
  656. (Default: 0).
  657. .LP
  658. .TP
  659. \fBAutomapHostsSuffixes\fP \fR\fISUFFIX\fR,\fISUFFIX\fR,...\fP
  660. A comma-separated list of suffixes to use with \fBAutomapHostsOnResolve\fP.
  661. The "." suffix is equivalent to "all addresses."
  662. (Default: .exit,.onion).
  663. .LP
  664. .TP
  665. \fBDNSPort\fP \fR\fIPORT\fP
  666. If non-zero, Tor listens for UDP DNS requests on this port and resolves them
  667. anonymously.
  668. (Default: 0).
  669. .LP
  670. .TP
  671. \fBDNSListenAddress\fP \fR\fIIP\fR[:\fIPORT\fR]\fP
  672. Bind to this address to listen for DNS connections.
  673. (Default: 127.0.0.1).
  674. .LP
  675. .TP
  676. \fBClientDNSRejectInternalAddresses\fP \fR\fB0\fR|\fB1\fR\fP
  677. If true, Tor does not believe any anonymously retrieved DNS answer that tells
  678. it that an address resolves to an internal address (like 127.0.0.1 or
  679. 192.168.0.1). This option prevents certain browser-based attacks; don't turn
  680. it off unless you know what you're doing. (Default: 1).
  681. .LP
  682. .TP
  683. \fBDownloadExtraInfo\fP \fR\fB0\fR|\fB1\fR\fP
  684. If true, Tor downloads and caches "extra-info" documents. These
  685. documents contain information about servers other than the information
  686. in their regular router descriptors. Tor does not use this information for
  687. anything itself; to save bandwidth, leave this option turned off.
  688. (Default: 0).
  689. .LP
  690. .TP
  691. .SH SERVER OPTIONS
  692. .PP
  693. The following options are useful only for servers (that is, if \fBORPort\fP is non-zero):
  694. .LP
  695. .TP
  696. \fBAddress \fR\fIaddress\fP
  697. The IP or fqdn of this server (e.g. moria.mit.edu). You can leave this
  698. unset, and Tor will guess your IP.
  699. .LP
  700. .TP
  701. \fBAssumeReachable \fR\fB0\fR|\fB1\fR\fP
  702. This option is used when bootstrapping a new Tor network. If set to 1,
  703. don't do self-reachability testing; just upload your server descriptor
  704. immediately. If \fBAuthoritativeDirectory\fP is also set, this option
  705. instructs the dirserver to bypass remote reachability testing too and
  706. list all connected servers as running.
  707. .LP
  708. .TP
  709. \fBContactInfo \fR\fIemail_address\fP
  710. Administrative contact information for server. This line might get
  711. picked up by spam harvesters, so you may want to obscure the fact
  712. that it's an email address.
  713. .LP
  714. .TP
  715. \fBExitPolicy \fR\fIpolicy\fR,\fIpolicy\fR,\fI...\fP
  716. Set an exit policy for this server. Each policy is of the form
  717. "\fBaccept\fP|\fBreject\fP \fIADDR\fP[\fB/\fP\fIMASK\fP]\fB[:\fP\fIPORT\fP]".
  718. If \fB/\fP\fIMASK\fP is omitted then this policy just applies to the host
  719. given. Instead of giving a host or network you can also use "\fB*\fP" to
  720. denote the universe (0.0.0.0/0). \fIPORT\fP can be a single port number,
  721. an interval of ports "\fIFROM_PORT\fP\fB-\fP\fITO_PORT\fP", or "\fB*\fP".
  722. If \fIPORT\fP is omitted, that means "\fB*\fP".
  723. For example, "accept 18.7.22.69:*,reject 18.0.0.0/8:*,accept *:*" would
  724. reject any traffic destined for MIT except for web.mit.edu, and
  725. accept anything else.
  726. To specify all internal and link-local networks (including 0.0.0.0/8,
  727. 169.254.0.0/16, 127.0.0.0/8, 192.168.0.0/16, 10.0.0.0/8, and
  728. 172.16.0.0/12), you can use the "private" alias instead of an address.
  729. These addresses are rejected by default (at the beginning of your
  730. exit policy) unless you set the ExitPolicyRejectPrivate config option
  731. to 0. For example, once you've done that, you could allow HTTP to
  732. 127.0.0.1 and block all other connections to internal networks with
  733. "accept
  734. 127.0.0.1:80,reject private:*". See RFC 1918 and RFC 3330 for more
  735. details about internal and reserved IP address space.
  736. This directive can be specified multiple times so you don't have to put
  737. it all on one line.
  738. Policies are considered first to last, and the first match wins. If
  739. you want to _replace_ the default exit policy, end your exit policy with
  740. either a reject *:* or an accept *:*. Otherwise, you're _augmenting_
  741. (prepending to) the default exit policy. The default exit policy is:
  742. .PD 0
  743. .RS 12
  744. .IP "reject *:25"
  745. .IP "reject *:119"
  746. .IP "reject *:135-139"
  747. .IP "reject *:445"
  748. .IP "reject *:465"
  749. .IP "reject *:563"
  750. .IP "reject *:587"
  751. .IP "reject *:1214"
  752. .IP "reject *:4661-4666"
  753. .IP "reject *:6346-6429"
  754. .IP "reject *:6699"
  755. .IP "reject *:6881-6999"
  756. .IP "accept *:*"
  757. .RE
  758. .PD
  759. .LP
  760. .TP
  761. \fBExitPolicyRejectPrivate \fR\fB0\fR|\fB1\fR\fP
  762. Reject all private (local) networks at the beginning of your exit
  763. policy. See above entry on ExitPolicy. (Default: 1)
  764. .LP
  765. .TP
  766. \fBMaxOnionsPending \fR\fINUM\fP
  767. If you have more than this number of onionskins queued for decrypt, reject new ones. (Default: 100)
  768. .LP
  769. .TP
  770. \fBMyFamily \fR\fInode\fR,\fInode\fR,\fI...\fP
  771. Declare that this Tor server is controlled or administered by a group
  772. or organization identical or similar to that of the other servers, defined by their identity fingerprints or nicknames.
  773. When two servers both declare that they are in the same 'family', Tor clients
  774. will not use them in the same circuit. (Each server only needs to list the
  775. other servers in its family; it doesn't need to list itself, but it won't hurt.)
  776. .LP
  777. .TP
  778. \fBNickname \fR\fIname\fP
  779. Set the server's nickname to 'name'. Nicknames must be between 1
  780. and 19 characters inclusive, and must contain only the characters
  781. [a-zA-Z0-9].
  782. .LP
  783. .TP
  784. \fBNumCPUs \fR\fInum\fP
  785. How many processes to use at once for decrypting onionskins. (Default: 1)
  786. .LP
  787. .TP
  788. \fBORPort \fR\fIPORT\fP
  789. Advertise this port to listen for connections from Tor clients and servers.
  790. .LP
  791. .TP
  792. \fBORListenAddress \fR\fIIP\fR[:\fIPORT\fR]\fP
  793. Bind to this IP address to listen for connections from Tor clients and
  794. servers. If you specify a port, bind to this port rather than the one
  795. specified in ORPort. (Default: 0.0.0.0)
  796. This directive can be specified multiple times to bind to multiple
  797. addresses/ports.
  798. .LP
  799. .TP
  800. \fBPublishServerDescriptor \fR\fB0\fR|\fB1\fR|\fBv1\fR|\fBv2\fR|\fBv3\fR|\fBbridge\fR|\fBhidserv\fR, ...\fP
  801. This option is only considered if you have an ORPort defined. You can
  802. choose multiple arguments, separated by commas.
  803. If set to 0, Tor will act as a server but it will not publish its
  804. descriptor to the directory authorities. (This is useful if you're
  805. testing out your server, or if you're using a Tor controller that handles
  806. directory publishing for you.) Otherwise, Tor will publish its descriptor
  807. to all directory authorities of the type(s) specified. The value "1" is
  808. treated as a synonym for the default, which is currently "v1,v2".
  809. .LP
  810. .TP
  811. \fBRedirectExit \fR\fIpattern target\fP
  812. THIS OPTION IS DEPRECATED. It will go away in a future version of Tor.
  813. Whenever an outgoing connection tries to connect to one of a given set
  814. of addresses, connect to \fItarget\fP (an \fIaddress:port\fP pair) instead.
  815. The address
  816. pattern is given in the same format as for an exit policy. The
  817. address translation applies after exit policies are applied. Multiple
  818. \fBRedirectExit\fP options can be used: once any one has matched
  819. successfully, no subsequent rules are considered. You can specify that no
  820. redirection is to be performed on a given set of addresses by using the
  821. special target string "pass", which prevents subsequent rules from being
  822. considered.
  823. .LP
  824. .TP
  825. \fBShutdownWaitLength\fR \fINUM\fP
  826. When we get a SIGINT and we're a server, we begin shutting down: we close
  827. listeners and start refusing new circuits. After \fBNUM\fP seconds,
  828. we exit. If we get a second SIGINT, we exit immediately. (Default:
  829. 30 seconds)
  830. .LP
  831. .TP
  832. \fBAccountingMax \fR\fIN\fR \fBbytes\fR|\fBKB\fR|\fBMB\fR|\fBGB\fR|\fBTB\fP
  833. Never send more than the specified number of bytes in a given
  834. accounting period, or receive more than that number in the period.
  835. For example, with AccountingMax set to 1 GB, a server could send 900 MB
  836. and receive 800 MB and continue running. It will only hibernate once one
  837. of the two reaches 1 GB.
  838. When the number of bytes is exhausted, Tor will hibernate until some
  839. time in the next accounting period. To prevent all servers from
  840. waking at the same time, Tor will also wait until a random point in
  841. each period before waking up. If you have bandwidth cost issues,
  842. enabling hibernation is preferable to setting a low bandwidth, since it
  843. provides users with a collection of fast servers that are up some of
  844. the time, which is more useful than a set of slow servers that are
  845. always "available".
  846. .LP
  847. .TP
  848. \fBAccountingStart \fR\fBday\fR|\fBweek\fR|\fBmonth\fR [\fIday\fR] \fIHH:MM\fR\fP
  849. Specify how long accounting periods last. If \fBmonth\fP is given,
  850. each accounting period runs from the time \fIHH:MM\fR on the
  851. \fIday\fRth day of one month to the same day and time of the next.
  852. (The day must be between 1 and 28.) If \fBweek\fP is given, each
  853. accounting period runs from the time \fIHH:MM\fR of the \fIday\fRth
  854. day of one week to the same day and time of the next week, with Monday
  855. as day 1 and Sunday as day 7. If \fBday\fR is given, each accounting
  856. period runs from the time \fIHH:MM\fR each day to the same time on the
  857. next day. All times are local, and given in 24-hour time. (Defaults to
  858. "month 1 0:00".)
  859. .LP
  860. .TP
  861. \fBServerDNSResolvConfFile \fR\fIfilename\fP
  862. Overrides the default DNS configuration with the configuration in
  863. \fIfilename\fP. The file format is the same as the standard Unix
  864. "\fBresolv.conf\fP" file (7). This option, like all other
  865. ServerDNS options, only affects name lookups that your server does on
  866. behalf of clients. Also, it only takes effect if Tor was built with
  867. eventdns support. (Defaults to use the system DNS configuration.)
  868. .LP
  869. .TP
  870. \fBServerDNSSearchDomains \fR\fB0\fR|\fB1\fR\fP
  871. If set to \fB1\fP, then we will search for addresses in the local search
  872. domain. For example, if this system is configured to believe it is in
  873. "example.com", and a client tries to connect to "www", the client will be
  874. connected to "www.example.com".
  875. This option only affects name lookups that your server does on
  876. behalf of clients, and only takes effect if Tor was built with
  877. eventdns support.
  878. (Defaults to "0".)
  879. .LP
  880. .TP
  881. \fBServerDNSDetectHijacking \fR\fB0\fR|\fB1\fR\fP
  882. When this option is set to 1, we will test periodically to determine whether
  883. our local nameservers have been configured to hijack failing DNS requests
  884. (usually to an advertising site). If they are, we will attempt to correct
  885. this.
  886. This option only affects name lookups that your server does on
  887. behalf of clients, and only takes effect if Tor was built with
  888. eventdns support.
  889. (Defaults to "1".)
  890. .LP
  891. .TP
  892. \fBServerDNSTestAddresses \fR\fIaddress\fR,\fIaddress\fR,\fI...\fP
  893. When we're detecting DNS hijacking, make sure that these \fIvalid\fP
  894. addresses aren't getting redirected. If they are, then our DNS is
  895. completely useless, and we'll reset our exit policy to "reject *:*".
  896. This option only affects name lookups that your server does on
  897. behalf of clients, and only takes effect if Tor was built with
  898. eventdns support.
  899. (Defaults to "www.google.com, www.mit.edu, www.yahoo.com,
  900. www.slashdot.org".)
  901. .LP
  902. .TP
  903. \fBServerDNSAllowNonRFC953Hostnames \fR\fB0\fR|\fB1\fR\fP
  904. When this option is disabled, Tor does not try to resolve hostnames
  905. containing illegal characters (like @ and :) rather than sending them to an
  906. exit node to be resolved. This helps trap accidental attempts to resolve
  907. URLs and so on.
  908. This option only affects name lookups that your server does on
  909. behalf of clients, and only takes effect if Tor was built with
  910. eventdns support.
  911. (Default: 0)
  912. .SH DIRECTORY SERVER OPTIONS
  913. .PP
  914. The following options are useful only for directory servers (that is, if \fBDirPort\fP is non-zero):
  915. .LP
  916. .TP
  917. \fBAuthoritativeDirectory \fR\fB0\fR|\fB1\fR\fP
  918. When this option is set to 1, Tor operates as an authoritative
  919. directory server. Instead of caching the directory, it generates its
  920. own list of good servers, signs it, and sends that to the clients.
  921. Unless the clients already have you listed as a trusted directory, you
  922. probably do not want to set this option. Please coordinate with the other
  923. admins at tor-ops@freehaven.net if you think you should be a directory.
  924. .LP
  925. .TP
  926. \fBV1AuthoritativeDirectory \fR\fB0\fR|\fB1\fR\fP
  927. When this option is set in addition to \fBAuthoritativeDirectory\fP, Tor
  928. generates version 1 directory and running-routers documents (for legacy
  929. Tor clients up to 0.1.0.x).
  930. .LP
  931. .TP
  932. \fBV2AuthoritativeDirectory \fR\fB0\fR|\fB1\fR\fP
  933. When this option is set in addition to \fBAuthoritativeDirectory\fP, Tor
  934. generates version 2 network statuses and serves descriptors, etc as
  935. described in doc/spec/dir-spec.txt.
  936. .LP
  937. .TP
  938. \fBVersioningAuthoritativeDirectory \fR\fB0\fR|\fB1\fR\fP
  939. When this option is set to 1, Tor adds information on
  940. which versions of Tor are still believed safe for use to
  941. the published directory. Each version 1 authority is
  942. automatically a versioning authority; version 2 authorities
  943. provide this service optionally. See \fBRecommendedVersions\fP,
  944. \fBRecommendedClientVersions\fP, and \fBRecommendedServerVersions\fP.
  945. .LP
  946. .TP
  947. \fBNamingAuthoritativeDirectory \fR\fB0\fR|\fB1\fR\fP
  948. When this option is set to 1, then the server advertises that it has
  949. opinions about nickname-to-fingerprint bindings. It will include these
  950. opinions in its published network-status pages, by listing servers with
  951. the flag "Named" if a correct binding between that nickname and
  952. fingerprint has been registered with the dirserver. Naming dirservers
  953. will refuse to accept or publish descriptors that contradict a
  954. registered binding. See \fBapproved-routers\fP in the \fBFILES\fP
  955. section below.
  956. .LP
  957. .TP
  958. \fBHSAuthoritativeDir \fR\fB0\fR|\fB1\fR\fP
  959. When this option is set in addition to \fBAuthoritativeDirectory\fP, Tor also
  960. accepts and serves hidden service descriptors. (Default: 0)
  961. .LP
  962. .TP
  963. \fBHSAuthorityRecordStats \fR\fB0\fR|\fB1\fR\fP
  964. When this option is set in addition to \fBHSAuthoritativeDir\fP, Tor
  965. periodically (every 15 minutes) writes statistics about hidden service
  966. usage to a file \fBhsusage\fP in its data directory. (Default: 0)
  967. .LP
  968. .TP
  969. \fBDirPort \fR\fIPORT\fP
  970. Advertise the directory service on this port.
  971. .LP
  972. .TP
  973. \fBDirListenAddress \fR\fIIP\fR[:\fIPORT\fR]\fP
  974. Bind the directory service to this address. If you specify a port, bind
  975. to this port rather than the one specified in DirPort. (Default: 0.0.0.0)
  976. This directive can be specified multiple times to bind to multiple
  977. addresses/ports.
  978. .LP
  979. .TP
  980. \fBDirPolicy \fR\fIpolicy\fR,\fIpolicy\fR,\fI...\fP
  981. Set an entrance policy for this server, to limit who can connect to the
  982. directory ports.
  983. The policies have the same form as exit policies above.
  984. .LP
  985. .TP
  986. \fBRecommendedVersions \fR\fISTRING\fP
  987. STRING is a comma-separated list of Tor versions currently believed
  988. to be safe. The list is included in each directory, and nodes which
  989. pull down the directory learn whether they need to upgrade. This
  990. option can appear multiple times: the values from multiple lines are
  991. spliced together.
  992. When this is set then
  993. \fBVersioningAuthoritativeDirectory\fP should be set too.
  994. .LP
  995. .TP
  996. \fBRecommendedClientVersions \fR\fISTRING\fP
  997. STRING is a comma-separated list of Tor versions currently believed
  998. to be safe for clients to use. This information is included in version 2
  999. directories. If this is not set then the value of \fBRecommendedVersions\fR
  1000. is used.
  1001. When this is set then
  1002. \fBVersioningAuthoritativeDirectory\fP should be set too.
  1003. .LP
  1004. .TP
  1005. \fBRecommendedServerVersions \fR\fISTRING\fP
  1006. STRING is a comma-separated list of Tor versions currently believed
  1007. to be safe for servers to use. This information is included in version 2
  1008. directories. If this is not set then the value of \fBRecommendedVersions\fR
  1009. is used.
  1010. When this is set then
  1011. \fBVersioningAuthoritativeDirectory\fP should be set too.
  1012. .LP
  1013. .TP
  1014. \fBDirAllowPrivateAddresses \fR\fB0\fR|\fB1\fR\fP
  1015. If set to 1, Tor will accept router descriptors with arbitrary "Address"
  1016. elements. Otherwise, if the address is not an IP or is a private IP,
  1017. it will reject the router descriptor. Defaults to 0.
  1018. .LP
  1019. .TP
  1020. \fBAuthDirBadExit \fR\fIAddressPattern\fR...\fP
  1021. Authoritative directories only. A set of address patterns for servers that
  1022. will be listed as bad exits in any network status document this authority
  1023. publishes, if \fBAuthDirListBadExits\fR is set.
  1024. .LP
  1025. .TP
  1026. \fBAuthDirInvalid \fR\fIAddressPattern\fR...\fP
  1027. Authoritative directories only. A set of address patterns for servers that
  1028. will never be listed as "valid" in any network status document that this
  1029. authority publishes.
  1030. .LP
  1031. .TP
  1032. \fBAuthDirReject \fR\fIAddressPattern\fR...\fP
  1033. Authoritative directories only. A set of address patterns for servers that
  1034. will never be listed at all in any network status document that this
  1035. authority publishes, or accepted as an OR address in any descriptor submitted
  1036. for publication by this authority.
  1037. .LP
  1038. .TP
  1039. \fBAuthDirListBadExits \fR\fB0\fR|\fB1\fR\fP
  1040. Authoritative directories only. If set to 1, this directory has
  1041. some opinion about which nodes are unsuitable as exit nodes. (Do not
  1042. set this to 1 unless you plan to list nonfunctioning exits as bad;
  1043. otherwise, you are effectively voting in favor of every declared exit
  1044. as an exit.)
  1045. .LP
  1046. .TP
  1047. \fBAuthDirRejectUnlisted \fR\fB0\fR|\fB1\fR\fP
  1048. Authoritative directories only. If set to 1, the directory server
  1049. rejects all uploaded server descriptors that aren't explicitly listed
  1050. in the fingerprints file. This acts as a "panic button" if we get
  1051. Sybiled. (Default: 0)
  1052. .SH HIDDEN SERVICE OPTIONS
  1053. .PP
  1054. The following options are used to configure a hidden service.
  1055. .LP
  1056. .TP
  1057. \fBHiddenServiceDir \fR\fIDIRECTORY\fP
  1058. Store data files for a hidden service in DIRECTORY. Every hidden
  1059. service must have a separate directory. You may use this option multiple
  1060. times to specify multiple services.
  1061. .LP
  1062. .TP
  1063. \fBHiddenServicePort \fR\fIVIRTPORT \fR[\fITARGET\fR]\fP
  1064. Configure a virtual port VIRTPORT for a hidden service. You may use this
  1065. option multiple times; each time applies to the service using the most recent
  1066. hiddenservicedir. By default, this option maps the virtual port to the
  1067. same port on 127.0.0.1. You may override the target port, address, or both
  1068. by specifying a target of addr, port, or addr:port. You may also have
  1069. multiple lines with the same VIRTPORT: when a user connects to that VIRTPORT,
  1070. one of the TARGETs from those lines will be chosen at random.
  1071. .LP
  1072. .TP
  1073. \fBHiddenServiceNodes \fR\fInode\fR,\fInode\fR,\fI...\fP
  1074. If possible, use the specified nodes, defined by their identity fingerprints or
  1075. nicknames, as introduction points for the hidden service. If this is left
  1076. unset, Tor will be smart and pick some reasonable ones; most people can leave
  1077. this unset.
  1078. .LP
  1079. .TP
  1080. \fBHiddenServiceExcludeNodes \fR\fInode\fR,\fInode\fR,\fI...\fP
  1081. Do not use the specified nodes, defined by their identity fingerprints or
  1082. nicknames, as introduction points for the hidden service. In normal use there
  1083. is no reason to set this.
  1084. .LP
  1085. .TP
  1086. \fBPublishHidServDescriptors \fR\fB0\fR|\fB1\fR\fP
  1087. If set to 0, Tor will run any hidden services you configure, but it won't
  1088. advertise them to the rendezvous directory. This option is only useful
  1089. if you're using a Tor controller that handles hidserv publishing for you.
  1090. (Default: 1)
  1091. .LP
  1092. .TP
  1093. \fBRendPostPeriod \fR\fIN\fR \fBseconds\fR|\fBminutes\fR|\fBhours\fR|\fBdays\fR|\fBweeks\fP
  1094. Every time the specified period elapses, Tor uploads any rendezvous
  1095. service descriptors to the directory servers. This information is also
  1096. uploaded whenever it changes. (Default: 20 minutes)
  1097. .\" UNDOCUMENTED
  1098. .\" ignoreversion
  1099. .SH SIGNALS
  1100. Tor catches the following signals:
  1101. .LP
  1102. .TP
  1103. \fBSIGTERM\fR
  1104. Tor will catch this, clean up and sync to disk if necessary, and exit.
  1105. .LP
  1106. .TP
  1107. \fBSIGINT\fR
  1108. Tor clients behave as with SIGTERM; but Tor servers will do a controlled
  1109. slow shutdown, closing listeners and waiting 30 seconds before exiting.
  1110. (The delay can be configured with the ShutdownWaitLength config option.)
  1111. .LP
  1112. .TP
  1113. \fBSIGHUP\fR
  1114. The signal instructs Tor to reload its configuration (including closing
  1115. and reopening logs), fetch a new directory, and kill and restart its
  1116. helper processes if applicable.
  1117. .LP
  1118. .TP
  1119. \fBSIGUSR1\fR
  1120. Log statistics about current connections, past connections, and
  1121. throughput.
  1122. .LP
  1123. .TP
  1124. \fBSIGUSR2\fR
  1125. Switch all logs to loglevel debug. You can go back to the old loglevels
  1126. by sending a SIGHUP.
  1127. .LP
  1128. .TP
  1129. \fBSIGCHLD\fR
  1130. Tor receives this signal when one of its helper processes has exited,
  1131. so it can clean up.
  1132. .LP
  1133. .TP
  1134. \fBSIGPIPE\fR
  1135. Tor catches this signal and ignores it.
  1136. .LP
  1137. .TP
  1138. \fBSIGXFSZ\fR
  1139. If this signal exists on your platform, Tor catches and ignores it.
  1140. .SH FILES
  1141. .LP
  1142. .TP
  1143. .B @CONFDIR@/torrc
  1144. The configuration file, which contains "option value" pairs.
  1145. .LP
  1146. .TP
  1147. .B @LOCALSTATEDIR@/lib/tor/
  1148. The tor process stores keys and other data here.
  1149. .LP
  1150. .TP
  1151. .B \fIDataDirectory\fP/cached-status/*
  1152. The most recently downloaded network status document for each authority. Each file holds one such document; the filenames are the hexadecimal identity key fingerprints of the directory authorities.
  1153. .LP
  1154. .TP
  1155. .B \fIDataDirectory\fB/cached-descriptors\fR and \fBcached-descriptors.new\fR
  1156. These files hold downloaded router statuses. Some routers may appear more than once; if so, the most recently published descriptor is used. Lines beginning with @-signs are annotations that contain more information about a given router. The ".new" file is an append-only journal; when it gets too large, all entries are merged into a new cached-routers file.
  1157. .LP
  1158. .TP
  1159. .B \fIDataDirectory\fB/cached-routers\fR and \fBcached-routers.new\fR
  1160. Obsolete versions of cached-descriptors and cached-descriptors.new. When Tor can't find the newer files, it looks here instead.
  1161. .LP
  1162. .TP
  1163. .B \fIDataDirectory\fP/state
  1164. A set of persistent key-value mappings. These are documented in the file. These include:
  1165. .PD 0
  1166. .RS 5
  1167. .IP "- The current entry guards and their status."
  1168. .IP "- The current bandwidth accounting values (unused so far; see below)."
  1169. .IP "- When the file was last written"
  1170. .IP "- What version of Tor generated the state file"
  1171. .IP "- A short history of bandwidth usage, as produced in the router descriptors."
  1172. .RE
  1173. .PD
  1174. .LP
  1175. .TP
  1176. .B \fIDataDirectory\fP/bw_accounting
  1177. Used to track bandwidth accounting values (when the current period starts and ends; how much has been read and written so far this period). This file is obsolete, and the data is now stored in the 'state' file as well. Only used when bandwidth accounting is enabled.
  1178. .LP
  1179. .TP
  1180. .B \fIDataDirectory\fP/hsusage
  1181. Used to track hidden service usage in terms of fetch and publish
  1182. requests to this hidden service authoritative directory. Only used when
  1183. recording of statistics is enabled.
  1184. .LP
  1185. .TP
  1186. .B \fIDataDirectory\fP/control_auth_cookie
  1187. Used for cookie authentication with the controller. Location can be
  1188. overridden by the CookieAuthFile config option. Regenerated on startup.
  1189. See control-spec.txt for details. Only used when cookie authentication
  1190. is enabled.
  1191. .LP
  1192. .TP
  1193. .B \fIDataDirectory\fP/keys/*
  1194. Only used by servers. Holds identity keys and onion keys.
  1195. .LP
  1196. .TP
  1197. .B \fIDataDirectory\fP/fingerprint
  1198. Only used by servers. Holds the fingerprint of the server's identity key.
  1199. .LP
  1200. .TP
  1201. .B \fIDataDirectory\fP/approved-routers
  1202. Only for naming authoritative directory servers (see \fBNamingAuthoritativeDirectory\fP). This file lists nickname to identity bindings. Each line lists a nickname and a fingerprint separated by whitespace. See your \fBfingerprint\fP file in the \fIDataDirectory\fP for an example line. If the nickname is \fB!reject\fP then descriptors from the given identity (fingerprint) are rejected by this server. If it is \fB!invalid\fP then descriptors are accepted but marked in the directory as not valid, that is, not recommended.
  1203. .LP
  1204. .TP
  1205. .B \fIDataDirectory\fP/router-stability
  1206. Only used by authoritative directory servers. Tracks measurements for router mean-time-between-failures so that authorities have a good idea of how to set their Stable flags.
  1207. .LP
  1208. .TP
  1209. .B \fIHiddenServiceDirectory\fP/hostname
  1210. The <base32-encoded-fingerprint>.onion domain name for this hidden service.
  1211. .LP
  1212. .TP
  1213. .B \fIHiddenServiceDirectory\fP/private_key
  1214. The private key for this hidden service.
  1215. .SH SEE ALSO
  1216. .BR privoxy (1),
  1217. .BR tsocks (1),
  1218. .BR torify (1)
  1219. .BR http://tor.eff.org/
  1220. .SH BUGS
  1221. Plenty, probably. Tor is still in development. Please report them.
  1222. .SH AUTHORS
  1223. Roger Dingledine <arma@mit.edu>, Nick Mathewson <nickm@alum.mit.edu>.