tor.1.in 12 KB

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  1. .TH TOR 1 "November 2003" "TOR"
  2. .SH NAME
  3. tor \- The second-generation onion router
  4. .SH SYNOPSIS
  5. .B tor
  6. [\fIOPTION value\fR]...
  7. .SH DESCRIPTION
  8. .I tor
  9. is a connection-oriented anonymizing communication
  10. service. Users choose a source-routed path through a set of nodes, and
  11. negotiate a "virtual circuit" through the network, in which each node
  12. knows its predecessor and successor, but no others. Traffic flowing down
  13. the circuit is unwrapped by a symmetric key at each node, which reveals
  14. the downstream node.
  15. .PP
  16. Basically \fItor\fR provides a distributed network of servers ("onion
  17. routers"). Users bounce their tcp streams -- web traffic, ftp, ssh, etc --
  18. around the routers, and recipients, observers, and even the routers
  19. themselves have difficulty tracking the source of the stream.
  20. .SH OPTIONS
  21. \fB-h, -help\fP
  22. Display a short help message and exit.
  23. .TP
  24. \fB-f \fR\fIFILE\fP
  25. FILE contains further "option value" pairs. (Default: @CONFDIR@/torrc)
  26. .TP
  27. Other options can be specified either on the commandline (\fI--option
  28. value\fR), or in the configuration file (\fIoption value\fR).
  29. Options are case-insensitive.
  30. .TP
  31. \fBLogLevel debug|info|notice|warn|err\fP
  32. Set the verboseness level of the primary log. (Default: warn. Abbreviation:
  33. -l.)
  34. .TP
  35. \fBLogFile \fR\fIFILE\fP
  36. Rather than logging to stdout, log to FILE.
  37. .TP
  38. \fBSysLog 1\fP
  39. Rather than logging to stdout, send messages to the system log. (Not
  40. supported on all platforms)
  41. .TP
  42. \fBBandwidthRate \fR\fINUM\fP
  43. A token bucket limits the average incoming bandwidth on this node to NUM bytes per second. (Default: 800000)
  44. .TP
  45. \fBBandwidthBurst \fR\fINUM\fP
  46. Limit the maximum token bucket size (also known as the burst) to NUM bytes. (Default: 10000000)
  47. .TP
  48. \fBDirServer \fR\fIaddress:port fingerprint\fP
  49. Use a nonstandard authoritative directory server at the provided
  50. address and port, with the specified key fingerprint. This option can
  51. be repeated many times, for multiple authoritative directory
  52. servers. If no \fBdirserver\fP line is given, Tor will use the default
  53. directory servers: moria1, moria2, and tor26.
  54. .TP
  55. \fBDebugLogFile \fR\fIFILE\fP
  56. In addition to other logging, we will log to FILE at log-level debug.
  57. (Deprecated; use LogFile and LogLevel instead.)
  58. .TP
  59. \fBGroup \fR\fIGID\fP
  60. On startup, setgid to this user.
  61. .TP
  62. \fBKeepalivePeriod \fR\fINUM\fP
  63. To keep firewalls from expiring connections, send a padding keepalive cell on open connections every NUM seconds. (Default: 300)
  64. .TP
  65. \fBMaxConn \fR\fINUM\fP
  66. Maximum number of simultaneous connections allowed. You probably don't need
  67. to adjust this. (Default: 900)
  68. .TP
  69. \fBOutboundBindAddress \fR\fIP\fP
  70. Make all outbound connections originate from the IP address specified. This
  71. is only useful when you have multiple network interfaces, and you want all
  72. of Tor's outgoing connections to use a single one.
  73. .TP
  74. \fBPIDFile \fR\fIFILE\fP
  75. On startup, write our PID to FILE. On clean shutdown, remove FILE.
  76. .TP
  77. \fBRunAsDaemon \fR\fI0|1\fP
  78. If 1, Tor forks and daemonizes to the background. (Default: 0)
  79. .TP
  80. \fBUser \fR\fIUID\fP
  81. On startup, setuid to this user.
  82. .SH CLIENT OPTIONS
  83. .PP
  84. The following options are useful only for clients (that is, if \fBSOCKSPort\fP is non-zero):
  85. .TP
  86. \fBAllowUnverifiedNodes \fR\fIentry|exit|middle|introduction|rendezvous,...\fP
  87. Where on our circuits should we allow Tor servers that the directory
  88. servers haven't authenticated as "verified"? (Default: middle,rendezvous.)
  89. \fBdirfetchpostperiod \fR\fIseconds\fP
  90. Every N seconds, Tor downloads a fresh directory, and re-uploads
  91. information about hidden services to the directory servers. If
  92. running as a server, Tor also re-uploads information about itself to
  93. the directory servers. (Tor also uploads this information whenever it
  94. changes.) (Default: 600.)
  95. .TP
  96. \fBClientOnly \fR\fI0|1\fP
  97. If set to 1, Tor will under no circumstances run as a server. (Usually,
  98. you don't need to set this; Tor is pretty smart at figuring out whether
  99. you are reliable and high-bandwith enough to be a good server.)
  100. .TP
  101. \fBEntryNodes \fR\fInickname,nickname,...\fP
  102. A list of preferred nodes to use for the first hop in the circuit, if possible.
  103. .TP
  104. \fBExitNodes \fR\fInickname,nickname,...\fP
  105. A list of preferred nodes to use for the last hop in the circuit, if possible.
  106. .TP
  107. \fBExcludeNodes \fR\fInickname,nickname,...\fP
  108. A list of nodes to never use when building a circuit.
  109. .TP
  110. \fBStrictExitNodes \fR\fI0|1\fP
  111. If 1, Tor will never use any nodes besides those listed in "exitnodes" for
  112. the last hop of a circuit.
  113. .TP
  114. \fBStrictEntryNodes \fR\fI0|1\fP
  115. If 1, Tor will never use any nodes besides those listed in "entrynodes" for
  116. the first hop of a circuit.
  117. .TP
  118. \fBFascistFirewall \fR\fI0|1\fP
  119. If 1, Tor will only create outgoing connections to ORs running on ports that
  120. your firewall allows (defaults to 80 and 443; see firewallports). This will
  121. allow you to run Tor as a client behind a firewall with restrictive policies,
  122. but will not allow you to run as a server behind such a firewall.
  123. .TP
  124. \fBFirewallPorts \fR\fIPORTS\fP
  125. A list of ports that your firewall allows you to connect to. Only used when
  126. fascistfirewall is set. (Default: 80, 443.)
  127. .TP
  128. \fB
  129. \fBNewCircuitPeriod \fR\fINUM\fP
  130. Every NUM seconds consider whether to build a new circuit. (Default: 60)
  131. .TP
  132. \fBNodeFamily \fR\fInickname,nickname,...\fP
  133. The named Tor servers constitute a "family" of similar or
  134. co-administared servers, so never use any two of them in the same
  135. circuit. This option can be used multiple times.
  136. .TP
  137. .\" \fBPathlenCoinWeight \fR\fI0.0-1.0\fP
  138. .\" Paths are 3 hops plus a geometric distribution centered around this coinweight. Must be >=0.0 and <1.0. (Default: 0.3) NOT USED CURRENTLY
  139. .\" .TP
  140. \fBRendNodes \fR\fInickname,nickname,...\fP
  141. A list of preferred nodes to use for the rendezvous point, if possible.
  142. .TP
  143. \fBRendExcludeNodes \fR\fInickname,nickname,...\fP
  144. A list of nodes to never use when choosing a rendezvous point.
  145. .TP
  146. \fBSOCKSPort \fR\fIPORT\fP
  147. Bind to this port to listen for connections from SOCKS-speaking applications.
  148. Set this to 0 if you don't want to allow application connections. (Default:
  149. 9050)
  150. .TP
  151. \fBSOCKSBindAddress \fR\fIIP\fP
  152. Bind to this address to listen for connections from socks-speaking applications. (Default: 127.0.0.1) You can also specify a port (e.g. 192.168.0.1:9100). This directive can be specified multiple times to bind to multiple addresses/ports.
  153. .TP
  154. \fBSOCKSPolicy \fR\fIpolicy,policy,...\fP
  155. Set an entrance policy for this server, to limit who can connect to the socks ports. The policies have the same form as exit policies below.
  156. .SH SERVER OPTIONS
  157. .PP
  158. The following options are useful only for servers (that is, if \fBORPort\fP is non-zero):
  159. .TP
  160. \fBAddress \fR\fIaddress\fP
  161. The IP or fqdn of this server (e.g. moria.mit.edu).
  162. .TP
  163. \fBDataDirectory \fR\fIDIR\fP
  164. Store working data in DIR (Default: @LOCALSTATEDIR@/lib/tor)
  165. .TP
  166. \fBExitPolicy \fR\fIpolicy,policy,...\fP
  167. Set an exit policy for this server. Each policy is of the form
  168. "\fBreject\fP \fIADDR\fP\fB/\fP\fIMASK\fP\fB:\fP\fIPORT\fP".
  169. If \fB/\fP\fIMASK\fP is omitted then this policy just applies to the host
  170. given. Instead of giving a host or network you can also use "\fB*\fP" to
  171. denote the universe (0.0.0.0/0). \fIPORT\fP can either be a single port number
  172. or an interval of ports: "\fIFROM_PORT\fP\fB-\fP\fITO_PORT\fP".
  173. For example, "reject 127.0.0.1:*,reject 192.168.1.0/24:*,accept *:*" would
  174. reject any traffic destined for localhost and any 192.168.1.* address, but
  175. accept anything else.
  176. This directive can be specified multiple times so you don't have to put
  177. it all on one line.
  178. See RFC 3330 for more details about internal and reserved IP address
  179. space. The default exit policy is:
  180. .PD 0
  181. .RS 12
  182. .IP "reject 0.0.0.0/8" 0
  183. .IP "reject 169.254.0.0/16" 4
  184. .IP "reject 127.0.0.0/8"
  185. .IP "reject 192.168.0.0/16"
  186. .IP "reject 10.0.0.0/8"
  187. .IP "reject 172.16.0.0/12"
  188. .IP "accept *:20-22"
  189. .IP "accept *:53"
  190. .IP "accept *:79-81"
  191. .IP "accept *:110"
  192. .IP "accept *:143"
  193. .IP "accept *:443"
  194. .IP "accept *:873"
  195. .IP "accept *:993"
  196. .IP "accept *:995" 4
  197. .IP "reject *:4661-4662"
  198. .IP "reject *:1214"
  199. .IP "reject *:6346"
  200. .IP "accept *:1024-65535"
  201. .IP "reject *:*"
  202. .RE
  203. .PD
  204. .TP
  205. \fBMaxOnionsPending \fR\fINUM\fP
  206. If you have more than this number of onionskins queued for decrypt, reject new ones. (Default: 100)
  207. .TP
  208. \fBMyFamily \fR\fInickname,nickname,...\fP
  209. Declare that this Tor server is controlled or administered by a group
  210. or organization identical or similar to that of the other named servers.
  211. When two servers both declare that they are in the same 'family', Tor clients
  212. will not use them in the same circuit.
  213. .TP
  214. \fBNickname \fR\fIname\fP
  215. Set the server's nickname to 'name'.
  216. .TP
  217. \fBNumCPUs \fR\fInum\fP
  218. How many processes to use at once for decrypting onionskins. (Default: 1)
  219. .TP
  220. \fBORPort \fR\fIPORT\fP
  221. Bind to this port to listen for connections from Tor clients and servers.
  222. .TP
  223. \fBORBindAddress \fR\fIIP\fP
  224. Bind to this address to listen for connections from Tor clients and servers. (Default: 0.0.0.0)
  225. .TP
  226. \fBRedirectExit \fR\fIpattern target\fP
  227. Whenever an outgoing connection tries to connect to one of a given set
  228. of addresses, connect to \fItarget\fP (an \fIaddress:port\fP pair) instead.
  229. The address
  230. pattern is given in the same format as for an exit policy. The
  231. address translation applies after exit policies are applied. Multiple
  232. \fBRedirectExit\fP options can be used: once any one has matched
  233. successfully, no subsequent rules are considered. You can specify that no
  234. redirection is to be performed on a given set of addresses by using the
  235. special target string "pass", which prevents subsequent rules from being
  236. considered.
  237. .SH DIRECTORY SERVER OPTIONS
  238. .PP
  239. The following options are useful only for directory servers (that is, if \fBDirPort\fP is non-zero):
  240. .TP
  241. \fBAuthoritativeDirectory \fR\fI0|1\fP
  242. When this option is set to 1, Tor operates as an authoritative
  243. directory server. Instead of caching the directory, it generates its
  244. own list of good servers, signs it, and sends that to the clients.
  245. Unless the clients already have you listed as a trusted directory, you
  246. probably do not want to set this option. Please coordinate with the other
  247. admins at tor-ops@freehaven.net if you think you should be a directory.
  248. .TP
  249. \fBContactInfo \fR\fIemail address\fP
  250. Administrative contact information for server.
  251. .TP
  252. \fBDirPort \fR\fIPORT\fP
  253. Bind the directory service to this port.
  254. .TP
  255. \fBDirBindAddress \fR\fIIP\fP
  256. Bind the directory service to this address. (Default: 0.0.0.0)
  257. .TP
  258. \fBDirPolicy \fR\fIpolicy,policy,...\fP
  259. Set an entrance policy for this server, to limit who can connect to the directory ports. The policies have the same form as exit policies above.
  260. .TP
  261. \fBRecommendedVersions \fR\fISTRING\fP
  262. STRING is a command-separated list of Tor versions currently believed
  263. to be safe. The list is included in each directory, and nodes which
  264. pull down the directory learn whether they need to upgrade. This
  265. option can appear multiple times: the values from multiple lines are
  266. spliced together.
  267. .TP
  268. \fBRunTesting \fR\fI0|1\fP
  269. If set to 1, Tor tries to build circuits through all of the servers it
  270. knows about, so it can tell which are up and which are down. This
  271. option is only useful for authoritative directories, so you probably
  272. don't want to use it.
  273. .SH HIDDEN SERVICE OPTIONS
  274. .PP
  275. The following options are used to configure a hidden service.
  276. .TP
  277. \fBHiddenServiceDir \fR\fIDIRECTORY\fP
  278. Store data files for a hidden service in DIRECTORY. Every hidden
  279. service must have a separate directory. You may use this option multiple
  280. times to specify multiple services.
  281. .TP
  282. \fBHiddenServicePort \fR\fIVIRTPORT \fR[\fITARGET\fR]\fP
  283. Configure a virtual port VIRTPORT for a hidden service. You may use this
  284. option multiple times; each time applies to the service using the most recent
  285. hiddenservicedir. By default, this option maps the virtual port to the
  286. same port on 127.0.0.1. You may override the target port, address, or both
  287. by specifying a target of addr, port, or addr:port.
  288. .TP
  289. \fBHiddenServiceNodes \fR\fInickname,nicknamme,...\fP
  290. If possible, use the specified nodes as introduction points for the hidden
  291. service.
  292. .TP
  293. \fBHiddenServiceExcludeNodes \fR\fInickname,nicknamme,...\fP
  294. Do not use the specified nodes as introduction points for the hidden
  295. service.
  296. .\" UNDOCUMENTED
  297. .\" ignoreversion
  298. .SH FILES
  299. .TP
  300. .I @CONFDIR@/torrc
  301. The configuration file, which contains "option value" pairs.
  302. .TP
  303. .I @CONFDIR@/dirservers
  304. A list of directory servers, to bootstrap into the network.
  305. .TP
  306. .I @LOCALSTATEDIR@/lib/tor/
  307. The tor process stores keys and other data here.
  308. .SH SEE ALSO
  309. .BR privoxy (1),
  310. .BR tsocks (1)
  311. .BR http://freehaven.net/tor/
  312. .SH BUGS
  313. Plenty, probably. It's still in alpha. Please report them.
  314. .SH AUTHORS
  315. Roger Dingledine <arma@mit.edu>, Nick Mathewson <nickm@alum.mit.edu>.