tor/doc/codecon04.mgp

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Tor: 
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Next-generation Onion Routing


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Roger Dingledine
Nick Mathewson
Paul Syverson

The Free Haven Project
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http://freehaven.net/

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Low-latency anonymity system

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Deployed: 20 nodes, hundreds (?) of users

Many improvements on earlier design

Free software -- modified BSD license

Design is not covered by earlier onion routing
patent

Uses SOCKS to interface with client apps

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We have working code

(14 kloc of C)

and a design document,
and a byte-level specification,
and a Debian package (in Unstable)

Works on Linux, BSD, OSX, Cygwin, ...
User-space, doesn't need kernel mods or root

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http://freehaven.net/tor/

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%%A bit about Onion Routing
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%%Improvements we've made
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%%Some related work
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Anonymity: Who needs it?

Private citizens
	advocacy, counseling, whistleblowing, reporting, ...
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Higher-level protocols
	voting, e-cash, auctions
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Government applications
	research, law enforcement
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Business applications
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(hide relationships and volumes of communication)
	Who is visiting job sites?
	Which groups are talking to patent lawyers?
	Who are your suppliers and customers?
	Is the CEO talking to a buyout partner?

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Anonymity is a network effect

	Systems need traffic (many low-sensitivity users) to attract the high-sensitivity users
	Most users do not value anonymity much
	Weak security (fast system) can mean more users
		which can mean 
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stronger 
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anonymity
	High-sensitivity agents have incentive to run nodes
		so they can be certain first node in their path is good
		to attract traffic for their messages
	There can be an optimal level of free-riding

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Onion Routing is...

An overlay network

Users build virtual circuits through the network

One layer of encryption at each hop

Fixed-size cells

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Tor's goals

Conservative design
	minimize new design work needed

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Support testing of future research

Design for deployment; deploy for use

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Threat model -- what we aim for

Protect against somebody watching Alice

Protect against curious Bob

Protect against `some' curious nodes in the middle

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Differences / limitations


We're TCP-only, not all IP (but we're user-space and very portable)

Not as strong as high-latency systems (Mixmaster, Mixminion)

Not peer-to-peer

No protocol normalization

Not unobservable (no steg, etc)

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Perfect forward secrecy


Telescoping circuit

	negotiates keys at each hop
	no more need for replay detection

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No mixing, padding, traffic shaping (yet)


Please show us they're worth the usability tradeoff

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Many TCP streams share a circuit

Previous designs built a new circuit for each stream

	lots of public key ops per request
	plus anonymity dangers from making so many circuits

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Leaky-pipe circuit topology

Alice can direct cells to any node in her circuit

	So we can support long-range padding,
	have multiple streams exiting at different places in the circuit
	etc

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Unclear whether this is dangerous or useful

More research needed

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Congestion control


Simple rate limiting

Plus have to keep internal nodes from overflowing

(Can't use global state or inter-node control)

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Directory servers

To solve the `introduction' problem

Approve new servers

Tell clients who's up right now

	plus their keys, location, etc

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Variable exit policies


Each server allows different outgoing connections

E.g. no servers allow outgoing mail currently

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End-to-end integrity checking


In previous onion routing, an insider could change
the text being transmitted:

"dir" => "rm *"

Even an external adversary could do this!

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Rendezvous points

allow hidden services

don't need (brittle) reply onions

	Access-controlled: Bob can control who he talks to
	Robust: Bob's service is available even when some Tor nodes go down
	Smear-resistant: Evil service can't frame a rendezvous router
	Application-transparent: Don't need to modify Bob's apache

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(Not implemented yet)

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How do we compare security?

Assume adversary owns c of n nodes
	can choose which
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What's the chance for a random Alice and Bob that he wins?

Freedom, Tor: (c/n)^2
Peekabooty, six-four, etc: c/n
Jap (if no padding): 1 if c>1
Anonymizer: 1 if c>0

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Future work

Threshold directory agreement

Scalability: Morphmix/p2p extensions?
Restricted-route (non-clique topology)

Non-TCP transport

Implement rendezvous points

Make it work better

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We have working code

Plus a design document,
and a byte-level specification
and a Debian package (in Unstable)

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http://freehaven.net/tor/

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Privacy Enhancing Technologies workshop

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http://petworkshop.org/