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							- Filename: 098-todo.txt
 
- Title: Proposals that should be written
 
- Version: $Revision$
 
- Last-Modified: $Date$
 
- Author: Nick Mathewson, Roger Dingledine
 
- Created: 26-Jan-2007
 
- Status: Meta
 
- Overview:
 
-    This document lists ideas that various people have had for improving the
 
-    Tor protocol.  These should be implemented and specified if they're
 
-    trivial, or written up as proposals if they're not.
 
-    This is an active document, to be edited as proposals are written and as
 
-    we come up with new ideas for proposals.  We should take stuff out as it
 
-    seems irrelevant.
 
- For some later protool version.
 
-   - Fix onionskin handshake scheme to be more mainstream, less nutty.
 
-     Can we just do
 
-         E(HMAC(g^x), g^x) rather than just E(g^x) ?
 
-     No, that has the same flaws as before. We should send
 
-         E(g^x, C) with random C and expect g^y, HMAC_C(K=g^xy).
 
-     Better ask Ian; probably Stephen too.
 
-   - Versioned CREATE and friends
 
-   - Length on CREATE and friends
 
-   - Versioning on circuits
 
-   - Versioning on create cells
 
-   - SHA1 is showing its age
 
-   - Not being able to upgrade ciphersuites or increase key lengths is
 
-     lame.
 
-   - Paul has some ideas about circuit creation; read his PET paper once it's
 
-     out.
 
-   - Allow more TLS ciphersuites.
 
- Any time:
 
-   - Some ideas for revising the directory protocol:
 
-     - Should we also look into a "delta since last network-status
 
-       checkpoint" scheme, to reduce overhead further?
 
-     - Extend the "r" line in network-status to give a set of buckets (say,
 
-       comma-separated) for that router.
 
-       - Buckets are deterministic based on IP address.
 
-       - Then clients can choose a bucket (or set of buckets) to
 
-         download and use.
 
-     - We need a way for the authorities to declare that nodes are in a
 
-       family.  Also, it kinda sucks that family declarations use O(N^2) space
 
-       in the descriptors.
 
-   - REASON_CONNECTFAILED should include an IP.
 
-   - Spec should incorporate some prose from tor-design to be more readable.
 
-   - Spec when we should rotate which keys
 
-   - Spec how to publish descriptors less often
 
-   - Describe pros and cons of non-deterministic path lengths
 
-   - get rid of the Named flag, or automate it at the dir auth end,
 
-     or automate it at the client end, or something.
 
-   - We should use a variable-length path length by default -- 3 +/- some
 
-     distribution. Need to think harder about allowing values less than 3,
 
-     and there's a tradeoff between having a wide variance and performance.
 
- Things that should change...
 
- B.1. ... but which will require backward-incompatible change
 
-   - Circuit IDs should be longer.
 
-   - IPv6 everywhere.
 
-   - Maybe, keys should be longer.
 
-     - Maybe, key-length should be adjustable.  How to do this without
 
-       making anonymity suck?
 
-   - Drop backward compatibility.
 
-   - We should use a 128-bit subgroup of our DH prime.
 
-   - Handshake should use HMAC.
 
-   - Multiple cell lengths.
 
-   - Ability to split circuits across paths (If this is useful.)
 
-   - SENDME windows should be dynamic.
 
-   - Directory
 
-      - Stop ever mentioning socks ports
 
- B.1. ... and that will require no changes
 
-    - Mention multiple addr/port combos
 
-    - Advertised outbound IP?
 
-    - Migrate streams across circuits.
 
- B.2. ... and that we have no idea how to do.
 
-    - UDP (as transport)
 
-    - UDP (as content)
 
-    - Use a better AES mode that has built-in integrity checking,
 
-      doesn't grow with the number of hops, is not patented, and
 
-      is implemented and maintained by smart people.
 
- Let onion keys be not just RSA but maybe DH too, for Paul's reply onion
 
- design.
 
 
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