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- Filename: 101-dir-voting.txt
- Title: Voting on the Tor Directory System
- Version: $Revision$
- Last-Modified: $Date$
- Author: Nick Mathewson
- Created:
- Status: Closed
- Implemented-In: 0.2.0.x
- Overview
- This document describes a consensus voting scheme for Tor directories;
- instead of publishing different network statuses, directories would vote on
- and publish a single "consensus" network status document.
- This is an open proposal.
- Proposal:
- 0. Scope and preliminaries
- This document describes a consensus voting scheme for Tor directories.
- Once it's accepted, it should be merged with dir-spec.txt. Some
- preliminaries for authority and caching support should be done during
- the 0.1.2.x series; the main deployment should come during the 0.2.0.x
- series.
- 0.1. Goals and motivation: voting.
- The current directory system relies on clients downloading separate
- network status statements from the caches signed by each directory.
- Clients download a new statement every 30 minutes or so, choosing to
- replace the oldest statement they currently have.
- This creates a partitioning problem: different clients have different
- "most recent" networkstatus sources, and different versions of each
- (since authorities change their statements often).
- It also creates a scaling problem: most of the downloaded networkstatus
- are probably quite similar, and the redundancy grows as we add more
- authorities.
- So if we have clients only download a single multiply signed consensus
- network status statement, we can:
- - Save bandwidth.
- - Reduce client partitioning
- - Reduce client-side and cache-side storage
- - Simplify client-side voting code (by moving voting away from the
- client)
- We should try to do this without:
- - Assuming that client-side or cache-side clocks are more correct
- than we assume now.
- - Assuming that authority clocks are perfectly correct.
- - Degrading badly if a few authorities die or are offline for a bit.
- We do not have to perform well if:
- - No clique of more than half the authorities can agree about who
- the authorities are.
- 1. The idea.
- Instead of publishing a network status whenever something changes,
- each authority instead publishes a fresh network status only once per
- "period" (say, 60 minutes). Authorities either upload this network
- status (or "vote") to every other authority, or download every other
- authority's "vote" (see 3.1 below for discussion on push vs pull).
- After an authority has (or has become convinced that it won't be able to
- get) every other authority's vote, it deterministically computes a
- consensus networkstatus, and signs it. Authorities download (or are
- uploaded; see 3.1) one another's signatures, and form a multiply signed
- consensus. This multiply-signed consensus is what caches cache and what
- clients download.
- If an authority is down, authorities vote based on what they *can*
- download/get uploaded.
- If an authority is "a little" down and only some authorities can reach
- it, authorities try to get its info from other authorities.
- If an authority computes the vote wrong, its signature isn't included on
- the consensus.
- Clients use a consensus if it is "trusted": signed by more than half the
- authorities they recognize. If clients can't find any such consensus,
- they use the most recent trusted consensus they have. If they don't
- have any trusted consensus, they warn the user and refuse to operate
- (and if DirServers is not the default, beg the user to adapt the list
- of authorities).
- 2. Details.
- 2.0. Versioning
- All documents generated here have version "3" given in their
- network-status-version entries.
- 2.1. Vote specifications
- Votes in v3 are similar to v2 network status documents. We add these
- fields to the preamble:
- "vote-status" -- the word "vote".
- "valid-until" -- the time when this authority expects to publish its
- next vote.
- "known-flags" -- a space-separated list of flags that will sometimes
- be included on "s" lines later in the vote.
- "dir-source" -- as before, except the "hostname" part MUST be the
- authority's nickname, which MUST be unique among authorities, and
- MUST match the nickname in the "directory-signature" entry.
- Authorities SHOULD cache their most recently generated votes so they
- can persist them across restarts. Authorities SHOULD NOT generate
- another document until valid-until has passed.
- Router entries in the vote MUST be sorted in ascending order by router
- identity digest. The flags in "s" lines MUST appear in alphabetical
- order.
- Votes SHOULD be synchronized to half-hour publication intervals (one
- hour? XXX say more; be more precise.)
- XXXX some way to request older networkstatus docs?
- 2.2. Consensus directory specifications
- Consensuses are like v3 votes, except for the following fields:
- "vote-status" -- the word "consensus".
- "published" is the latest of all the published times on the votes.
- "valid-until" is the earliest of all the valid-until times on the
- votes.
- "dir-source" and "fingerprint" and "dir-signing-key" and "contact"
- are included for each authority that contributed to the vote.
- "vote-digest" for each authority that contributed to the vote,
- calculated as for the digest in the signature on the vote. [XXX
- re-English this sentence]
- "client-versions" and "server-versions" are sorted in ascending
- order based on version-spec.txt.
- "dir-options" and "known-flags" are not included.
- [XXX really? why not list the ones that are used in the consensus?
- For example, right now BadExit is in use, but no servers would be
- labelled BadExit, and it's still worth knowing that it was considered
- by the authorities. -RD]
- The fields MUST occur in the following order:
- "network-status-version"
- "vote-status"
- "published"
- "valid-until"
- For each authority, sorted in ascending order of nickname, case-
- insensitively:
- "dir-source", "fingerprint", "contact", "dir-signing-key",
- "vote-digest".
- "client-versions"
- "server-versions"
- The signatures at the end of the document appear as multiple instances
- of directory-signature, sorted in ascending order by nickname,
- case-insensitively.
- A router entry should be included in the result if it is included by more
- than half of the authorities (total authorities, not just those whose votes
- we have). A router entry has a flag set if it is included by more than
- half of the authorities who care about that flag. [XXXX this creates an
- incentive for attackers to DOS authorities whose votes they don't like.
- Can we remember what flags people set the last time we saw them? -NM]
- [Which 'we' are we talking here? The end-users never learn which
- authority sets which flags. So you're thinking the authorities
- should record the last vote they saw from each authority and if it's
- within a week or so, count all the flags that it advertised as 'no'
- votes? Plausible. -RD]
- The signature hash covers from the "network-status-version" line through
- the characters "directory-signature" in the first "directory-signature"
- line.
- Consensus directories SHOULD be rejected if they are not signed by more
- than half of the known authorities.
- 2.2.1. Detached signatures
- Assuming full connectivity, every authority should compute and sign the
- same consensus directory in each period. Therefore, it isn't necessary to
- download the consensus computed by each authority; instead, the authorities
- only push/fetch each others' signatures. A "detached signature" document
- contains a single "consensus-digest" entry and one or more
- directory-signature entries. [XXXX specify more.]
- 2.3. URLs and timelines
- 2.3.1. URLs and timeline used for agreement
- An authority SHOULD publish its vote immediately at the start of each voting
- period. It does this by making it available at
- http://<hostname>/tor/status-vote/current/authority.z
- and sending it in an HTTP POST request to each other authority at the URL
- http://<hostname>/tor/post/vote
- If, N minutes after the voting period has begun, an authority does not have
- a current statement from another authority, the first authority retrieves
- the other's statement.
- Once an authority has a vote from another authority, it makes it available
- at
- http://<hostname>/tor/status-vote/current/<fp>.z
- where <fp> is the fingerprint of the other authority's identity key.
- The consensus network status, along with as many signatures as the server
- currently knows, should be available at
- http://<hostname>/tor/status-vote/current/consensus.z
- All of the detached signatures it knows for consensus status should be
- available at:
- http://<hostname>/tor/status-vote/current/consensus-signatures.z
- Once an authority has computed and signed a consensus network status, it
- should send its detached signature to each other authority in an HTTP POST
- request to the URL:
- http://<hostname>/tor/post/consensus-signature
- [XXXX Store votes to disk.]
- 2.3.2. Serving a consensus directory
- Once the authority is done getting signatures on the consensus directory,
- it should serve it from:
- http://<hostname>/tor/status/consensus.z
- Caches SHOULD download consensus directories from an authority and serve
- them from the same URL.
- 2.3.3. Timeline and synchronization
- [XXXX]
- 2.4. Distributing routerdescs between authorities
- Consensus will be more meaningful if authorities take steps to make sure
- that they all have the same set of descriptors _before_ the voting
- starts. This is safe, since all descriptors are self-certified and
- timestamped: it's always okay to replace a signed descriptor with a more
- recent one signed by the same identity.
- In the long run, we might want some kind of sophisticated process here.
- For now, since authorities already download one another's networkstatus
- documents and use them to determine what descriptors to download from one
- another, we can rely on this existing mechanism to keep authorities up to
- date.
- [We should do a thorough read-through of dir-spec again to make sure
- that the authorities converge on which descriptor to "prefer" for
- each router. Right now the decision happens at the client, which is
- no longer the right place for it. -RD]
- 3. Questions and concerns
- 3.1. Push or pull?
- The URLs above define a push mechanism for publishing votes and consensus
- signatures via HTTP POST requests, and a pull mechanism for downloading
- these documents via HTTP GET requests. As specified, every authority will
- post to every other. The "download if no copy has been received" mechanism
- exists only as a fallback.
- 4. Migration
- * It would be cool if caches could get ready to download consensus
- status docs, verify enough signatures, and serve them now. That way
- once stuff works all we need to do is upgrade the authorities. Caches
- don't need to verify the correctness of the format so long as it's
- signed (or maybe multisigned?). We need to make sure that caches back
- off very quickly from downloading consensus docs until they're
- actually implemented.
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