tor/doc/tor-spec.txt

$Id$ 

TOR (The Onion Router) Spec

Note: This is an attempt to specify TOR as it exists as implemented in
early March, 2003.  It is not recommended that others implement this
design as it stands; future versions of TOR will implement improved
protocols.

0. Notation:

   PK -- a public key.
   SK -- a private key 
   K  -- a key for a symmetric cypher

   a|b -- concatenation of 'a' with 'b'.
   a[i:j] -- Bytes 'i' through 'j'-1 (inclusive) of the string a.

   All numeric values are encoded in network (big-endian) order.

   Unless otherwise specified, all symmetric ciphers are DES in OFB
   mode, with an IV of all 0 bytes.  All asymmetric ciphers are RSA
   with 1024-bit keys, and exponents of 65537.

   [We will move to AES once we can assume everybody will have it. -RD]

1. System overview

[Something to start with here. Do feel free to change/expand. -RD]

Tor is an implementation of version 2 of Onion Routing.

Onion Routing is a connection-oriented anonymizing communication
service. Users build a layered block of asymmetric encryptions
(an "onion") which describes a source-routed path through a set of
nodes. Those nodes build a "virtual circuit" through the network, in which
each node knows its predecessor and successor, but no others. Traffic
flowing down the circuit is unwrapped by a symmetric key at each node,
which reveals the downstream node.



2. Connections

2.1. Establishing OR-to-OR connections

   When one onion router opens a connection to another, the initiating
   OR (called the 'client') and the listening OR (called the 'server')
   perform the following handshake.

   Before the handshake begins, the client and server know one
   another's (1024-bit) public keys, IPV4 addresses, and ports.

     1. Client connects to server:

        The client generates a pair of 8-byte symmetric keys (one
        [K_f] for the 'forward' stream from client to server, and one
        [K_b] for the 'backward' stream from server to client.

        The client then generates a 'Client authentication' message [M]
        containing: 
           The client's published IPV4 address    [4 bytes]
           The client's published port            [2 bytes]
           The server's published IPV4 address    [4 bytes]
           The server's published port            [2 bytes]
           The forward key (K_f)                  [8 bytes]
           The backward key (K_f)                 [8 bytes]
           The maximum bandwidth (bytes/s)        [4 bytes]
                                               [Total: 36 bytes] 

        The client then RSA-encrypts the message with the server's
        public key, and PKCS1 padding to given an encrypted message

        [Commentary: 1024 bytes is probably too short, and this protocol can't
        support IPv6. -NM]
        [1024 is too short for a high-latency remailer; but perhaps it's
         fine for us, given our need for speed and also given our greater
         vulnerability to other attacks? Onions are infrequent enough now
         that maybe we could handle it; but I worry it will impact
         scalability, and handling more users is important.-RD]
 
        The client then opens a TCP connection to the server, sends
        the 128-byte RSA-encrypted data to the server, and waits for a
        reply.

     2. Server authenticates to client:

        Upon receiving a TCP connection, the server waits to receive
        128 bytes from the client.  It decrypts the message with its 
        private key, and checks the PKCS1 padding.  If the padding is
        incorrect, or if the message's length is other than 32 bytes,
        the server closes the TCP connection and stops handshaking.

        The server then checks the list of known ORs for one with the
        address and port given in the client's authentication.  If no
        such OR is known, or if the server is already connected to
        that OR, the server closes the current TCP connection and
        stops handshaking. 

        For later use, the server sets its keys for this connection,
        setting K_f to the client's K_b, and K_b to the client's K_f.

        The server then creates a server authentication message[M2] as
        follows: 
               Modified client authentication         [32 bytes]
               A random nonce [N]                     [8 bytes]
                                                  [Total: 40 bytes]
        The client authentication is generated from M by replacing
        the client's preferred bandwidth [B_c] with the server's
        preferred bandwidth [B_s], if B_s < B_c. 

        The server encrypts M2 with the client's public key (found
        from the list of known routers), using PKCS1 padding.

        The server sends the 128-byte encrypted message to the client,
        and waits for a reply.

     3. Client authenticates to server.

        Once the client has received 128 bytes, it decrypts them with
        its public key, and checks the PKCS1 padding.  If the padding
        is invalid, or the decrypted message's length is other than 40
        bytes, the client closes the TCP connection.

        The client checks that the addresses and keys in the reply
        message are the same as the ones it originally sent.  If not,
        it closes the TCP connection.

        The client updates the connection's bandwidth to that set by
        the server, and generates the following authentication message [M3]:
           The client's published IPV4 address    [4 bytes]
           The client's published port            [2 bytes]
           The server's published IPV4 address    [4 bytes]
           The server's published port            [2 bytes]
           The server-generated nonce [N]         [8 bytes]
                                             [Total: 20 bytes]

        Once again, the client encrypts this message using the
        server's public key and PKCS1 padding, and sends the resulting
        128-byte message to the server.

     4. Server checks client authentication

        The server once again waits to receive 128 bytes from the
        client, decrypts the message with its private key, and checks
        the PKCS1 padding.  If the padding is incorrect, or if the
        message's length is other than 20 bytes, the server closes the
        TCP connection and stops handshaking.

        If the addresses in the decrypted message M3 match those in M
        and M2, and if the nonce in M3 is the same as in M2, the
        handshake is complete, and the client and server begin sending
        cells to one another.  Otherwise, the server closes the TCP
        connection.

2.2. Establishing OP-to-OR connections

   When an Onion Proxy (OP) needs to establish a connection to an OR,
   the handshake is simpler because the OR does not need to verify the
   OP's identity.  The OP and OR establish the following steps:

     1. OP connects to OR:

        First, the OP generates a pair of 8-byte symmetric keys (one
        [K_f] for the 'forward' stream from OP to OR, and one
        [K_b] for the 'backward' stream from OR to OP.

        The OP generates a message [M] in the following format:
           Maximum bandwidth (bytes/s)      [4 bytes]
           Forward key [K_f]                [8 bytes]
           Backward key [K_b]               [8 bytes]
                                        [Total: 20 bytes]

        The OP encrypts M with the OR's public key and PKCS1 padding,
        opens a TCP connection to the OR's TCP port, and sends the
        resulting 128-byte encrypted message to the OR.

     2. OR receives keys:

        When the OR receives a connection from an OP [This is on a
        different port, right? How does it know the difference? -NM],
        [Correct. The 'or_port' config variable specifies the OR port,
         and the op_port variable specified the OP port. -RD]
        it waits for 128 bytes of data, and decrypts the resulting
        data with its private key, checking the PKCS1 padding.  If the
        padding is invalid, or the message is not 20 bytes long, the
        OR closes the connection.

        Otherwise, the connection is established, and the O is ready
        to receive cells.  

        The server sets its keys for this connection, setting K_f to
        the client's K_b, and K_b to the client's K_f.

2.3. Sending cells and link encryption

   Once the handshake is complete, the ORs or OR and OP send cells
   (specified below) to one another.  Cells are sent serially,
   encrypted with the DES-OFB keystream specified by the handshake
   protocol.  Over a connection, communicants encrypt outgoing cells
   with the connection's K_f, and decrypt incoming cells with the
   connection's K_b.

   [Commentary: This means that OR/OP->OR connections are malleable; I
    can flip bits in cells as they go across the wire, and see flipped
    bits coming out the cells as they are decrypted at the next
    server.  I need to look more at the data format to see whether
    this is exploitable, but if there's no integrity checking there
    either, I suspect we may have an attack here. -NM]
   [Yes, this protocol is open to tagging attacks. The payloads are
    encrypted inside the network, so it's only at the edge node and beyond
    that it's a worry. But adversaries can already count packets and
    observe/modify timing. It's not worth putting in hashes; indeed, it
    would be quite hard, because one of the sides of the circuit doesn't
    know the keys that are used for de/encrypting at each hop, so couldn't
    craft hashes anyway. See the Bandwidth Throttling (threat model)
    thread on http://archives.seul.org/or/dev/Jul-2002/threads.html. -RD]
   [Even if I don't control both sides of the connection, I can still
    do evil stuff.  For instance, if I can guess that a cell is a
    TOPIC_COMMAND_BEGIN cell to www.slashdot.org:80 , I can change the
    address and port to point to a machine I control. -NM]

3. Cell Packet format

   The basic unit of communication for onion routers and onion
   proxies is a fixed-width "Cell."  Each Cell contains the following
   fields:

        ACI (anonymous circuit identifier)    [2 bytes]
        Command                               [1 byte]
        Length                                [1 byte]
        Sequence number (unused, set to 0)    [4 bytes]
        Payload (padded with 0 bytes)         [120 bytes]
                                         [Total size: 128 bytes]

   The 'Command' field holds one of the following values:
         0 -- PADDING     (Padding)                 (See Sec 6.2)
         1 -- CREATE      (Create a circuit)        (See Sec 4)
         2 -- DATA        (End-to-end data)         (See Sec 5)
         3 -- DESTROY     (Stop using a circuit)    (See Sec 4)
         4 -- SENDME      (For flow control)        (See Sec 6.1)

   The interpretation of 'Length' and 'Payload' depend on the type of
   the cell.
      PADDING: Length is 0; Payload is 120 bytes of 0's. 
      CREATE: Length is a value between 1 and 120; the first 'length'
        bytes of payload contain a portion of an onion.
      DATA: Length is a value between 4 and 120; the first 'length'
        bytes of payload contain useful data.
      DESTROY: Neither field is used.
      SENDME: Length encodes a window size, payload is unused.

   Unused fields are filled with 0 bytes.  The payload is padded with
   0 bytes.

   PADDING cells are currently used to implement connection
   keepalive.  ORs and OPs send one another a PADDING cell every few
   minutes.

   CREATE and DESTROY cells are used to manage circuits; see section
   4 below.

   DATA cells are used to send commands and data along a circuit; see
   section 5 below.

   SENDME cells are used for flow control; see section 6 below.

4. Onions and circuit management

4.1. Setting up circuits

   An onion is a multi-layered structure, with one layer for each node
   in a circuit.  Each (unencrypted) layer has the following fields:

         Version                  [1 byte]
         Back cipher              [4 bits]
         Forward cipher           [4 bits]
         Port                     [2 bytes]
         Address                  [4 bytes]
         Expiration time          [4 bytes]
         Key seed material        [16 bytes]
                             [Total: 28 bytes]

     The value of Version is currently 2.

     The forward and backward ciphers fields can take the following values:
          0: Identity 
          1: Single DES in OFB
          2: RC4

     The port and address field denote the IPV4 address and port of
     the next onion router in the circuit, or are set to 0 for the
     last hop.

     The expiration time is a number of seconds since the epoch (1
     Jan 1970); by default, it is set to the current time plus one
     day.

   When constructing an onion to create a circuit from OR_1,
   OR_2... OR_N,  the onion creator performs the following steps:

      1. Let M = 100 random bytes.

      2. For I=N downto 1:
  
         A. Create an onion layer L, setting Version=2,
            BackCipher=DES/OFB(1), ForwardCipher=DES/OFB(2), 
            ExpirationTime=now + 1 day, and Seed=16 random bytes.

            If I=N, set Port=Address=0.  Else, set Port and Address to
            the IPV4 port and address of OR_{I+1}.

         B. Let M = L | M.

         C. Let K1_I = SHA1(Seed).
            Let K2_I = SHA1(K1_I).
            Let K3_I = SHA1(K2_I).

         D. Encrypt the first 128 bytes of M with the RSA key of
            OR_I, using no padding.  Encrypt the remaining portion of
            M with DES/OFB, using K1_I as a key and an all-0 IV.

      3. M is now the onion.

  To create a connection using the onion M, an OP or OR performs the
  following steps:

       1. If not already connected to the first router in the chain,
          open a new connection to that router.

       2. Choose an ACI not already in use on the connection with the
          first router in the chain.  If our address/port pair is
          numerically higher than the address/port pair of the other
          side, then let the high bit of the ACI be 1, else 0.

       3. To send M over the wire, prepend a 4-byte integer containing
          Len(M).  Call the result M'.  Let N=ceil(Len(M')/120).
          Divide M' into N chunks, such that:
             Chunk_I = M'[(I-1)*120:I*120]  for 1 <= I <= N-1
             Chunk_N = M'[(N-1)*120:Len(M')]

       4. Send N CREATE cells along the connection, setting the ACI
          on each to the selected ACI, setting the payload on each to
          the corresponding 'Chunk_I', and setting the length on each
          to the length of the payload.

   Upon receiving a CREATE cell along a connection, an OR performs
   the following steps:

       1. If we already have an 'open' circuit along this connection
          with this ACI, drop the cell.

          Otherwise, if we have no circuit along this connection with
          this ACI, let L = the integer value of the first 4 bytes of 
          the payload.  Create a half-open circuit with this ACI, and
          begin queueing CREATE cells for this circuit.

          Otherwise, we have a half-open circuit.  If the total
          payload length of the CREATE cells for this circuit is at
          least equal to the onion length in the first cell (minus
          4), then process the onion.
  
       2. Once we have a complete onion, decrypt the first 128 bytes
          of the onion with this OR's RSA private key, and extract
          the outmost onion layer.  If the version, back cipher, or
          forward cipher is unrecognized, or the expiration time is
          in the past, then tear down the circuit (see section 4.2).

          Compute K1 through K3 as above.  Use K1 to decrypt the rest
          of the onion using DES/OFB.

          If we are not the exit node, remove the first layer from the
          decrypted onion, and send the remainder to the next OR
          on the circuit, as specified above.  (Note that we'll
          choose a different ACI for this circuit on the connection
          with the next OR.)

   As an optimization, OR implementations may delay processing onions
   until a break in traffic allows time to do so without harming
   network latency too greatly.

4.2. Tearing down circuits

   Circuits are torn down when an unrecoverable error occurs along
   the circuit, or when all topics on a circuit are closed and the
   circuit's intended lifetime is over.

   To tear down a circuit, an OR or OP sends a DESTROY cell with that
   direction's ACI to the adjacent nodes on that circuit.

   Upon receiving a DESTROY cell, an OR frees resources associated
   with the corresponding circuit. If it's not the start or end of the
   circuit, it sends a DESTROY cell for that circuit to the next OR in
   the circuit. If the node is the start or end of the circuit, then
   it tears down any associated edge connections (see section 5.1).

   After a DESTROY cell has been processed, an OR ignores all data or
   destroy cells for the corresponding circuit.

4.3. Routing data cells

   When an OR receives a DATA cell, it checks the cell's ACI and
   determines whether it has a corresponding circuit along that
   connection.  If not, the OR drops the DATA cell.

   Otherwise, if the OR is not at the OP edge of the circuit (that is,
   either an 'exit node' or a non-edge node), it de/encrypts the length
   field and the payload with DES/OFB, as follows:
        'Forward' data cell (same direction as onion):
            Use K2 as key; encrypt.
        'Back' data cell (opposite direction from onion):
            Use K3 as key; decrypt.

   Otherwise, if the data cell has arrived to the OP edge of the circuit,
   the OP de/encrypts the length and payload fields with DES/OFB as
   follows:
         OP sends data cell:
            For I=1...N, decrypt with K2_I.
         OP receives data cell:
            For I=N...1, encrypt with K3_I.

   Edge nodes process the length and payload fields of DATA cells as
   described in section 5 below.

5. Application connections and topic management

5.1. Topics and TCP streams

   Within a circuit, the OP and the exit node use the contents of DATA
   packets to tunnel TCP connections ("Topics") across circuits.
   These connections are initiated by the OP.

   The first 4 bytes of each data cell are reserved as follows:
         Topic command           [1 byte]
         Unused, set to 0.       [1 byte]
         Topic ID                [2 bytes]

   The recognized topic commands are:
         1 -- TOPIC_BEGIN
         2 -- TOPIC_DATA
         3 -- TOPIC_END
         4 -- TOPIC_CONNECTED
         5 -- TOPIC_SENDME

   All DATA cells pertaining to the same tunneled connection have the
   same topic ID.

   To create a new anonymized TCP connection, the OP sends a
   TOPIC_BEGIN data cell with a payload encoding the address and port
   of the destination host.  The payload format is:
         ADDRESS | ',' | PORT | '\000'
   where ADDRESS may be a DNS hostname, or an IPv4 address in
   dotted-quad format; and where PORT is encoded in decimal.

   Upon receiving this packet, the exit node resolves the address as
   necessary, and opens a new TCP connection to the target port.  If
   the address cannot be resolved, or a connection can't be
   established, the exit node replies with a TOPIC_END cell.
   Otherwise, the exit node replies with a TOPIC_CONNECTED cell.

   The OP waits for a TOPIC_CONNECTED cell before sending any data.
   Once a connection has been established, the OP and exit node
   package stream data in TOPIC_DATA cells, and upon receiving such
   cells, echo their contents to the corresponding TCP stream.  

   When one side of the TCP stream is closed, the corresponding edge
   node sends a TOPIC_END cell along the circuit; upon receiving a
   TOPIC_END cell, the edge node closes the corresponding TCP stream.

   [This should probably become:

   When one side of the TCP stream is closed, the corresponding edge
   node sends a TOPIC_END cell along the circuit; upon receiving a
   TOPIC_END cell, the edge node closes its side of the corresponding
   TCP stream (by sending a FIN packet), but continues to accept and
   package incoming data until both sides of the TCP stream are
   closed.  At that point, the edge node sends a second TOPIC_END
   cell, and drops its record of the topic. -NM]

6. Flow control

6.1. Link throttling

   As discussed above in section 2.1, ORs and OPs negotiate a maximum
   bandwidth upon startup.  The communicants only read up to that
   number of bytes per second on average, though they may smooth the
   number of bytes read over a 10-second window. 
   [???? more detail? -NM]

   Communicants rely on TCP flow control to prevent the bandwidth
   from being exceeded.

6.2. Link padding

   On every cell connection, every ????/bandwidth seconds, if less
   than MIN(bandwidth/(100*128), 10) cells are waiting to be sent
   along a connection, nodes add a single padding cell to the cells
   they will send along the connection.

6.3. Circuit flow control

   To control a circuit's bandwidth usage, each node keeps track of
   how many cells it is allowed to send to the next hop in the circuit
   before queueing cells.  This 'window' value is initially set to
   1000 cells in each direction.  Each edge node on a circuit sends a
   SENDME cell (with length=100) every time it has received 100 cells
   on the circuit.  When a node receives a SENDME cell for a circuit,
   it increases the circuit's window in the corresponding by the value
   of the cell's length field, and (if not an edge node) passes an
   equivalent SENDME cell to the next node in the circuit.

   If a window value ever reaches 0, the OR queues cells for the
   corresponding circuit and direction until it receives an
   appropriate SENDME cell.

6.4. Topic flow control

   Edge nodes use TOPIC_SENDME data cells to implement end-to-end flow
   control for individual connections across circuits.  As with
   circuit flow control, edge nodes begin with a window of cells (500)
   per topic, and increment the window by a fixed value (50) upon
   receiving a TOPIC_SENDME cell.  Edge nodes create and additional
   TOPIC_SENDME cells when  [????] -NM

7. Directories and routers

[????]