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- ## Configuration file for a typical Tor user
- ## Last updated 22 September 2015 for Tor 0.2.7.3-alpha.
- ## (may or may not work for much older or much newer versions of Tor.)
- ##
- ## Lines that begin with "## " try to explain what's going on. Lines
- ## that begin with just "#" are disabled commands: you can enable them
- ## by removing the "#" symbol.
- ##
- ## See 'man tor', or https://www.torproject.org/docs/tor-manual.html,
- ## for more options you can use in this file.
- ##
- ## Tor will look for this file in various places based on your platform:
- ## https://www.torproject.org/docs/faq#torrc
- ## Tor opens a SOCKS proxy on port 9050 by default -- even if you don't
- ## configure one below. Set "SOCKSPort 0" if you plan to run Tor only
- ## as a relay, and not make any local application connections yourself.
- #SOCKSPort 9050 # Default: Bind to localhost:9050 for local connections.
- #SOCKSPort 192.168.0.1:9100 # Bind to this address:port too.
- ## Entry policies to allow/deny SOCKS requests based on IP address.
- ## First entry that matches wins. If no SOCKSPolicy is set, we accept
- ## all (and only) requests that reach a SOCKSPort. Untrusted users who
- ## can access your SOCKSPort may be able to learn about the connections
- ## you make.
- #SOCKSPolicy accept 192.168.0.0/16
- #SOCKSPolicy accept6 FC00::/7
- #SOCKSPolicy reject *
- ## Logs go to stdout at level "notice" unless redirected by something
- ## else, like one of the below lines. You can have as many Log lines as
- ## you want.
- ##
- ## We advise using "notice" in most cases, since anything more verbose
- ## may provide sensitive information to an attacker who obtains the logs.
- ##
- ## Send all messages of level 'notice' or higher to @LOCALSTATEDIR@/log/tor/notices.log
- #Log notice file @LOCALSTATEDIR@/log/tor/notices.log
- ## Send every possible message to @LOCALSTATEDIR@/log/tor/debug.log
- #Log debug file @LOCALSTATEDIR@/log/tor/debug.log
- ## Use the system log instead of Tor's logfiles
- #Log notice syslog
- ## To send all messages to stderr:
- #Log debug stderr
- ## Uncomment this to start the process in the background... or use
- ## --runasdaemon 1 on the command line. This is ignored on Windows;
- ## see the FAQ entry if you want Tor to run as an NT service.
- #RunAsDaemon 1
- ## The directory for keeping all the keys/etc. By default, we store
- ## things in $HOME/.tor on Unix, and in Application Data\tor on Windows.
- #DataDirectory @LOCALSTATEDIR@/lib/tor
- ## The port on which Tor will listen for local connections from Tor
- ## controller applications, as documented in control-spec.txt.
- #ControlPort 9051
- ## If you enable the controlport, be sure to enable one of these
- ## authentication methods, to prevent attackers from accessing it.
- #HashedControlPassword 16:872860B76453A77D60CA2BB8C1A7042072093276A3D701AD684053EC4C
- #CookieAuthentication 1
- ############### This section is just for location-hidden services ###
- ## Once you have configured a hidden service, you can look at the
- ## contents of the file ".../hidden_service/hostname" for the address
- ## to tell people.
- ##
- ## HiddenServicePort x y:z says to redirect requests on port x to the
- ## address y:z.
- #HiddenServiceDir @LOCALSTATEDIR@/lib/tor/hidden_service/
- #HiddenServicePort 80 127.0.0.1:80
- #HiddenServiceDir @LOCALSTATEDIR@/lib/tor/other_hidden_service/
- #HiddenServicePort 80 127.0.0.1:80
- #HiddenServicePort 22 127.0.0.1:22
- ################ This section is just for relays #####################
- #
- ## See https://www.torproject.org/docs/tor-doc-relay for details.
- ## Required: what port to advertise for incoming Tor connections.
- #ORPort 9001
- ## If you want to listen on a port other than the one advertised in
- ## ORPort (e.g. to advertise 443 but bind to 9090), you can do it as
- ## follows. You'll need to do ipchains or other port forwarding
- ## yourself to make this work.
- #ORPort 443 NoListen
- #ORPort 127.0.0.1:9090 NoAdvertise
- ## The IP address or full DNS name for incoming connections to your
- ## relay. Leave commented out and Tor will guess.
- #Address noname.example.com
- ## If you have multiple network interfaces, you can specify one for
- ## outgoing traffic to use.
- ## OutboundBindAddressExit will be used for all exit traffic, while
- ## OutboundBindAddressOR will be used for all other connections.
- ## If you do not wish to differentiate, use OutboundBindAddress to
- ## specify the same address for both in a single line.
- #OutboundBindAddressExit 10.0.0.4
- #OutboundBindAddressOR 10.0.0.5
- ## A handle for your relay, so people don't have to refer to it by key.
- ## Nicknames must be between 1 and 19 characters inclusive, and must
- ## contain only the characters [a-zA-Z0-9].
- #Nickname ididnteditheconfig
- ## Define these to limit how much relayed traffic you will allow. Your
- ## own traffic is still unthrottled. Note that RelayBandwidthRate must
- ## be at least 75 kilobytes per second.
- ## Note that units for these config options are bytes (per second), not
- ## bits (per second), and that prefixes are binary prefixes, i.e. 2^10,
- ## 2^20, etc.
- #RelayBandwidthRate 100 KBytes # Throttle traffic to 100KB/s (800Kbps)
- #RelayBandwidthBurst 200 KBytes # But allow bursts up to 200KB (1600Kb)
- ## Use these to restrict the maximum traffic per day, week, or month.
- ## Note that this threshold applies separately to sent and received bytes,
- ## not to their sum: setting "40 GB" may allow up to 80 GB total before
- ## hibernating.
- ##
- ## Set a maximum of 40 gigabytes each way per period.
- #AccountingMax 40 GBytes
- ## Each period starts daily at midnight (AccountingMax is per day)
- #AccountingStart day 00:00
- ## Each period starts on the 3rd of the month at 15:00 (AccountingMax
- ## is per month)
- #AccountingStart month 3 15:00
- ## Administrative contact information for this relay or bridge. This line
- ## can be used to contact you if your relay or bridge is misconfigured or
- ## something else goes wrong. Note that we archive and publish all
- ## descriptors containing these lines and that Google indexes them, so
- ## spammers might also collect them. You may want to obscure the fact that
- ## it's an email address and/or generate a new address for this purpose.
- #ContactInfo Random Person <nobody AT example dot com>
- ## You might also include your PGP or GPG fingerprint if you have one:
- #ContactInfo 0xFFFFFFFF Random Person <nobody AT example dot com>
- ## Uncomment this to mirror directory information for others. Please do
- ## if you have enough bandwidth.
- #DirPort 9030 # what port to advertise for directory connections
- ## If you want to listen on a port other than the one advertised in
- ## DirPort (e.g. to advertise 80 but bind to 9091), you can do it as
- ## follows. below too. You'll need to do ipchains or other port
- ## forwarding yourself to make this work.
- #DirPort 80 NoListen
- #DirPort 127.0.0.1:9091 NoAdvertise
- ## Uncomment to return an arbitrary blob of html on your DirPort. Now you
- ## can explain what Tor is if anybody wonders why your IP address is
- ## contacting them. See contrib/tor-exit-notice.html in Tor's source
- ## distribution for a sample.
- #DirPortFrontPage @CONFDIR@/tor-exit-notice.html
- ## Uncomment this if you run more than one Tor relay, and add the identity
- ## key fingerprint of each Tor relay you control, even if they're on
- ## different networks. You declare it here so Tor clients can avoid
- ## using more than one of your relays in a single circuit. See
- ## https://www.torproject.org/docs/faq#MultipleRelays
- ## However, you should never include a bridge's fingerprint here, as it would
- ## break its concealability and potentially reveal its IP/TCP address.
- #MyFamily $keyid,$keyid,...
- ## A comma-separated list of exit policies. They're considered first
- ## to last, and the first match wins.
- ##
- ## If you want to allow the same ports on IPv4 and IPv6, write your rules
- ## using accept/reject *. If you want to allow different ports on IPv4 and
- ## IPv6, write your IPv6 rules using accept6/reject6 *6, and your IPv4 rules
- ## using accept/reject *4.
- ##
- ## If you want to _replace_ the default exit policy, end this with either a
- ## reject *:* or an accept *:*. Otherwise, you're _augmenting_ (prepending to)
- ## the default exit policy. Leave commented to just use the default, which is
- ## described in the man page or at
- ## https://www.torproject.org/documentation.html
- ##
- ## Look at https://www.torproject.org/faq-abuse.html#TypicalAbuses
- ## for issues you might encounter if you use the default exit policy.
- ##
- ## If certain IPs and ports are blocked externally, e.g. by your firewall,
- ## you should update your exit policy to reflect this -- otherwise Tor
- ## users will be told that those destinations are down.
- ##
- ## For security, by default Tor rejects connections to private (local)
- ## networks, including to the configured primary public IPv4 and IPv6 addresses,
- ## and any public IPv4 and IPv6 addresses on any interface on the relay.
- ## See the man page entry for ExitPolicyRejectPrivate if you want to allow
- ## "exit enclaving".
- ##
- #ExitPolicy accept *:6660-6667,reject *:* # allow irc ports on IPv4 and IPv6 but no more
- #ExitPolicy accept *:119 # accept nntp ports on IPv4 and IPv6 as well as default exit policy
- #ExitPolicy accept *4:119 # accept nntp ports on IPv4 only as well as default exit policy
- #ExitPolicy accept6 *6:119 # accept nntp ports on IPv6 only as well as default exit policy
- #ExitPolicy reject *:* # no exits allowed
- ## Bridge relays (or "bridges") are Tor relays that aren't listed in the
- ## main directory. Since there is no complete public list of them, even an
- ## ISP that filters connections to all the known Tor relays probably
- ## won't be able to block all the bridges. Also, websites won't treat you
- ## differently because they won't know you're running Tor. If you can
- ## be a real relay, please do; but if not, be a bridge!
- #BridgeRelay 1
- ## By default, Tor will advertise your bridge to users through various
- ## mechanisms like https://bridges.torproject.org/. If you want to run
- ## a private bridge, for example because you'll give out your bridge
- ## address manually to your friends, uncomment this line:
- #PublishServerDescriptor 0
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