replay-firstpart 716 B

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  1. o Minor features (security):
  2. - Check for replays of the public-key encrypted portion of an
  3. INTRODUCE1 cell, in addition to the current check for replays of
  4. the g^x value. This prevents a possible class of active attacks
  5. by an attacker who controls both an introduction point and a
  6. rendezvous point, and who uses the malleability of AES-CTR to
  7. alter the encrypted g^x portion of the INTRODUCE1 cell. We
  8. think that these attacks is infeasible (requiring the attacker
  9. to send on the order of zettabytes of altered cells in a short
  10. interval), but we'd rather block them off in case there are any
  11. classes of this attack that we missed. Reported by dvorak.