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@@ -160,11 +160,11 @@ or flooding and send less data until the congestion subsides.
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\textbf{Directory servers:} The earlier Onion Routing design
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planned to flood link-state information through the network---an approach
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-that can be unreliable and open to partitioning attacks or
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-deception. Tor takes a simplified view toward distributing link-state
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+that can be unreliable and open to partitioning attacks.
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+Tor takes a simplified view toward distributing such
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information. Certain more trusted nodes act as \emph{directory
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servers}: they provide signed directories that describe known
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-routers and their availability. Users periodically download these
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+routers and their availability. Users periodically download the
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directories via HTTP.
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\textbf{Variable exit policies:} Tor provides a consistent mechanism
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@@ -388,8 +388,8 @@ multiple communications to or from a single user. Within this
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main goal, however, several considerations have directed
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Tor's evolution.
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-\textbf{Deployability:} The design must be implemented,
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-deployed, and used in the real world. Thus it
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+\textbf{Deployability:} The design must be deployed and used in the
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+real world. Thus it
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must not be expensive to run (for example, by requiring more bandwidth
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than volunteers are willing to provide); must not place a heavy
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liability burden on operators (for example, by allowing attackers to
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@@ -491,9 +491,9 @@ which points in the network he should attack.
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Our adversary might try to link an initiator Alice with her
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communication partners, or try to build a profile of Alice's
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behavior. He might mount passive attacks by observing the network edges
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-and correlating traffic entering and leaving the network---either
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-by relationships in packet timing; relationships in volume;
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-or relationships in externally visible user-selected
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+and correlating traffic entering and leaving the network---by
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+relationships in packet timing, volume, or externally visible
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+user-selected
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options. The adversary can also mount active attacks by compromising
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routers or keys; by replaying traffic; by selectively denying service
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to trustworthy routers to move users to
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Roger Dingledine