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@@ -1,11 +1,15 @@
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-Below is a proposal to mitigate insecure protocol use over Tor.
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-
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+Filename: 129-reject-plaintext-ports.txt
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Title: Block Insecure Protocols by Default
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+Version: $Revision$
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+Last-Modified: $Date$
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Author: Kevin Bauer & Damon McCoy
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-Date: January 15, 2008
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+Created: 2008-01-15
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+Status: Open
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Overview:
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+ Below is a proposal to mitigate insecure protocol use over Tor.
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+
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This document 1) demonstrates the extent to which insecure protocols are
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currently used within the Tor network, and 2) proposes a simple solution
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to prevent users from unknowingly using these insecure protocols. By
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@@ -38,9 +42,14 @@ Motivation:
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Security Implications:
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- None. This proposal is intended to improve Tor's security by limiting the
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+ This proposal is intended to improve Tor's security by limiting the
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use of insecure protocols.
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+ Roger added: By adding these warnings for only some of the risky
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+ behavior, users may do other risky behavior, not get a warning, and
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+ believe that it is therefore safe. But overall, I think it's better
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+ to warn for some of it than to warn for none of it.
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+
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Specification:
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As an initial step towards mitigating the use of the above-mentioned
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@@ -88,3 +97,19 @@ References:
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http://www.wired.com/politics/security/news/2007/09/embassy_hacks.
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Wired. September 10, 2007.
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+Implementation:
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+
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+ Roger added this feature in
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+ http://archives.seul.org/or/cvs/Jan-2008/msg00182.html
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+ He also added a status event for Vidalia to recognize attempts to use
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+ vulnerable-plaintext ports, so it can help the user understand what's
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+ going on and how to fix it.
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+
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+Next steps:
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+
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+ a) Vidalia should learn to recognize this controller status event,
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+ so we don't leave users out in the cold when we enable this feature.
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+
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+ b) We should decide which ports to reject by default. The current
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+ consensus is 23,109,110,143 -- the same set that we warn for now.
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+
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Roger Dingledine